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ARGUMENT AND THE “MORAL IMPACT” 
THEORY OF LAW 
ALANI GOLANSKI∗  
ABSTRACT 
 
The innovative Moral Impact Theory (“MIT”) of law claims that the 
moral impacts of legal institutional actions, rather than the linguistic 
content of “rules” or judicial or legislative pronouncements, determine 
law’s content.  MIT’s corollary is that legal interpretation consists in the 
inquiry into what is morally required as a consequence of the lawmaking 
actions. 
This paper challenges MIT by critiquing its attendant view of the 
nature of legal interpretation and argument.  Points include the following: 
(1) it is not practicable to predicate law’s content on the ability of legal 
officials to resolve moral controversies; (2) it would be impermissibly 
uncharitable to claim that participants in the legal system commit 
widespread error in failing to regard moral argument as the focus of legal 
interpretation; (3) whereas the legal official may initially respond to a 
conflict at the intuitive moral level, she must resolve the controversy at the 
deliberative, critical level, at which moral and legal thinking diverge; (4) 
because no two cases are precisely alike, and owing to the open texture of 
natural language, reference to extra-jurisdictional “persuasive” and 
“secondary” authority permeates legal argument, yet, nearly by 
definition, such linguistic sources cannot have engendered significant 
moral impacts in the home jurisdiction; and (5) one way or another, we 
ultimately arrive at linguistic contents. 
The paper concludes by accepting, as undeniable, that legal 
institutional actions have moral impacts, and generate moral obligations.  
Officials are obligated to adhere to certain constraints in their treatment 
of one another, cases, litigants and citizens.  Less explored, however, have 
been the ways in which legal pronouncements likely morally impact the 
community, beyond the issue of a duty to obey the law. 
 
 
  ∗  LL.M., James Kent Scholar, Columbia University School of Law; M.A. Philosophy, 
Graduate Center of the City University of New York; Director, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., New York, 
New York. I thank Robert Alexy for encouraging the project, David Lyons for his insightful comments 
on an earlier version of the paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The actions of legal institutions change facts and circumstances that 
are often morally relevant to our decision-making. Such actions change 
our moral obligations by affecting our expectations, options, and projects, 
as well as the conditions under which we interact.1 A community’s 
problems are typically larger than any individual, and so one way in which 
its legal system can improve the moral situation is “by changing the 
circumstances so that everyone does have the obligation to participate in a 
particular solution.”2 Legal philosopher Mark Greenberg has been 
fashioning a new theoretical system from these deceptively simple 
insights. 
But Greenberg’s endgame is to convince readers that the moral 
obligations triggered by legal institution actions are legal obligations.3 He 
calls this view the Moral Impact Theory “because it holds that the law is 
the moral impact of the relevant actions of legal institutions.”4 As a 
corollary, the Moral Impact Theory takes the practice of legal 
interpretation to consist of the inquiry into “what is morally required as a 
consequence of the lawmaking actions.”5 Greenberg’s view is that, 
regardless of how practitioners may theorize their own practice, what they 
actually do – and indeed what they should do – is to argue for legal 
interpretations that do “not correspond” to the linguistic content of the 
texts they hold out as supporting their claims.6 
Greenberg’s readers are likely already familiar with the decades-long 
controversy in legal philosophy known as the “Hart-Dworkin” debate 
concerning the relation between law and morality.7 Herbert Hart 
maintained that law and morality are firmly separate,8 although he allowed 
 
 
1. Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1290 (2014) 
[hereinafter Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory]. 
2. Id. at 1294. 
3. Id. at 1290. 
4. Id. (emphasis added). 
5. Id. at 1303. 
6. Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 72–73 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) [hereinafter Greenberg, The 
Standard Picture]. Greenberg’s system is both descriptive (purporting to show “how the actions of 
legal institutions make the law what it is”) and normative (offering “a correspondingly novel account 
of how to interpret legal texts”). Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1290. 
7. See Scott Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in 
RONALD DWORKIN 22 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007). 
8. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
614 (1958). 
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in his later “inclusive” thinking for the possibility of moral tests of legality 
in certain instances.9 Ronald Dworkin, in opposition, saw legal decision-
making as resting on the search for morally appropriate principles that 
legal officials must take into account.10  
Greenberg believes that an even more fundamental issue for legal 
philosophy arises from the way in which theorists go about explaining the 
nature of law’s content. Hence, he promises an “alternative to the two 
main views of law that have dominated legal thought.”11 In contrast to 
what most positivists and anti-positivists alike have presupposed, law’s 
content is not explained directly from the authoritativeness and linguistic 
content of legal institutional pronouncements, but rather indirectly from 
the perspective of the moral impacts of those pronouncements or other 
institutional actions on the back end.12 
Therefore, by Greenberg’s analysis, there is no separation of law and 
morals, but nor are moral principles included in law’s content merely 
because, in the interpretive exercise, they best justify those 
pronouncements. Rather, law is, fully and exclusively, the moral impact of 
legal institutional action,13 and for this reason reckoning moral impacts 
must be legal argument’s defining task. 
Greenberg’s model is novel, innovative, and noteworthy in a 
theoretical climate that has been increasingly receptive to links between 
law and morality. The work constructs a sophisticated “one-system 
picture,” by which law is rendered a branch of morality and affords the 
program’s constituent ideas “their most important expression” in the 
literature thus far.14 This article, however, gives reasons why Greenberg’s 
central and game-changing claim is troubling. 
Part I questions whether it is practicable to predicate law’s content on 
the ability of legal officials to resolve moral controversies. The Moral 
Impact Theory interprets the work of legal practitioners and officials in a 
new way, one that implicitly claims a special epistemic task, vantage 
point, and expertise on behalf of those legal actors, each of which defies 
 
 
9. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 258 (3d ed. 2012) (1961) [hereinafter HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW]. 
10. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26 (1978). 
11. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1290. 
12. Id. at 1301. 
13. See id. at 1290, 1330–31. 
14. Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160, 1198–99 (2015); see also 
Brian H. Bix, When Law Becomes Morality: Comments on Mark Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory of 
Law 1 (University of Minnesota Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14-27, 
2014) (stating that Greenberg’s paper “offers a new and provocative understanding of law and legal 
obligation”), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434075. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/7
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practical reality. At the same time, Greenberg implicitly takes practitioners 
to task for not adopting a moral impacts explanatory project. If accepted, 
the Theory would oblige practitioners to reconsider the sort of discourse in 
which they engage. 
Part II largely relies on recent institutional philosophy to critique 
Greenberg’s view that legal interpretation consists of inquiry into “what is 
morally required as a consequence of the lawmaking actions.”15 Although 
rooted in the identification of law with moral impact, his approach runs 
counter to the best explanation of legal practice. Indeed, lest participants in 
the legal system uncharitably be deemed to pervasively misunderstand the 
nature of legal argument, it appears clear that determining what is morally 
required is not the principal focus of the legal interpretive inquiry. Rather, 
aligning with the logic of institutional reality, law’s argumentative 
structure is best explained as accommodating nonmoral disagreement 
about the relationship between the existing legal materials and the new 
situation. 
Part III then summons certain writings from moral philosophy to 
discuss further issues straining the Moral Impact Theory’s identification of 
law with morality. Like some philosophical claims about morality, 
Greenberg’s supporting thesis about legal argument overlooks the 
distinction between “intuitive” and “critical” thinking.16 Although the 
legal official’s opening response to a legal controversy may intuitively 
seek out moral cues or prima facie moral principles, conflicts are 
“irresoluble at that level.”17 It is only at the different level of reasoned 
critical thinking that the controversy can be resolved. At this level, 
however, deliberation falls within law’s argumentative structure, which is 
now seen to rest primarily on nonmoral theoretical institutional concerns. 
Moral and legal deliberative structures are not necessarily the same, and 
indeed likely vary significantly. 
Part IV concludes by suggesting two further objections derived from 
ethical theory and legal practice. First, the Moral Impact Theory does not 
overcome the open question whether holding that R is the law is 
tantamount to holding that R is right.18 Contextualized to the practice of 
law, it remains an open issue whether argument about law’s content is 
argument about moral impacts. Second, more concretely hampering the 
 
 
15. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1303. 
16. See RICHARD M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 25, 53 
(1981). 
17. Id.  
18. GEORGE E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 1–37 (1903). 
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Theory is the widespread occurrence in adjudication of argument about the 
persuasiveness of extra-jurisdictional and secondary authority; yet, nearly 
by definition, such authority cannot have engendered significant moral 
impacts in the home jurisdiction. 
Finally, having upset the notion that law’s content consists in the 
moral impacts of legal institutional actions, this article briefly evaluates 
what the role and nature of those moral impacts are. The actions of legal 
institutions clearly have moral impacts, as Greenberg says. These impacts 
affect and condition legal official conduct and the legal system’s quest for 
legitimacy. The most fertile ground on which to examine such moral 
impacts, however, is with the community itself. Legal institutional conduct 
affects the polity’s moral profile in complex ways, some obvious, some 
quite subtle, and the community will have its own argumentative 
structures for assessing those impacts. 
I. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS ARE NOT WELL SUITED FOR RECKONING 
MORAL IMPACTS 
Legal officials and institutions neither have, nor are expected to have, 
the training or competence to decide “what is morally required.” If, as 
Greenberg contends, “law is the moral impact of the relevant actions of 
legal institutions,”19 and if legal officials do not adjudicate morality, and 
have no special epistemic expertise for doing so, then there is a serious 
disconnect between law and its practical administration.20 Yet, on the 
Moral Impact Theory, the contribution of a statute or court decision to 
law’s content depends on “the on-balance best resolution of conflicts 
between moral considerations,” on what, in other words, “the relevant 
moral values, on balance, support.”21 
Anticipating this objection, Greenberg counters that, under the Moral 
Impact Theory, law can indeed serve the function of resolving moral 
disagreement. Law can fulfill this function the way it resolves 
controversies, “by having a mechanism for generating specific orders 
(directed at particular individuals) that are backed up with force. . . . 
 
 
19. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1290. 
20. Scott Hershovitz attempts to suggest a way out of this dilemma, and more generally out of 
the “fly-bottle” that is the Hart-Dworkin debate, namely, by continuing to talk as if, but not to think 
that, there is a “distinctively legal domain of normativity.” Hershovitz, supra note 14, at 1192–94. This 
essay does not further address the eliminativist position as recommended by Hershovitz except, for 
now, to agree with Liam Murphy that, absent a genuinely legal domain of normativity, “it would be 
implausible to think that nothing important had been lost in translation.” Liam Murphy, Better to See 
Law This Way, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1088, 1106 (2008). 
21. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1330–31. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/7
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Specific orders directed at individuals are required in order to end 
disagreement in a peaceful way.”22 Well maybe. But the Moral Impact 
Theory rejects “Explanatory Directness,” namely, the idea that the law 
created by the legal institution “is the law that it says it creates or means to 
create.”23 The very point of the Theory is to claim that we derive the law 
by working out the impact of legal institutional decisions on moral 
obligations, rather than by “determin[ing] what the courts said or meant.”24 
Greenberg’s reasoning is also a bit equivocal about how the relevant 
moral and hence legal obligations arise, which in turn likely implicates 
law’s ability to track them. On the one hand, Greenberg assigns moral 
reasoning a role “that is more procedural,” whereby practitioners engaged 
in interpretation ask about the moral implication of the fact that the 
legislature acted or the court decided in a particular way.25 A legal system 
adjusts moral standards “by giving notice” of its enactments and 
pronouncements.26 Decisions reached in a democratic system of 
governance in which “everyone has an equal opportunity to participate” 
have moral force.27 By this view, when pro tanto moral obligations come 
about in “the legally proper way,” they are legal obligations.28 
On the other hand, legal institutions change our moral obligations, 
under Greenberg’s theory, when they act in such a way as to change our 
broader “moral profile.”29 Changes in law’s content arise, in other words, 
when legal institutions impact or alter the broader range of “our moral 
obligations, powers, privileges, and so on.”30 This approach to moral 
impacts, however, would appear to be consistent with a variety of types of 
 
 
22. Id. at 1339–40. 
23. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 71. 
24. Id. at 75. Greenberg provides compelling exemplars of how, in legal interpretation, the 
same linguistic content may be read differently under different applications, the reasonable explanation 
being that the varying moral impact of the statutory content determines what the law is, hence how to 
construe the texts. Id. at 76–77. These interpretive outcomes are debated, however, and it begs the 
question to presuppose that law’s content is other than the statutory language as interpreted. In other 
respects, Greenberg attempts to deflate his theory’s conceptual implications for legal argument to a 
mere psychological matter. Considering that judges have “limited time and capacities,” and that the 
Moral Impact Theory, if accepted, might well make “impossibly difficult the everyday task of working 
out what the law is,” he responds that “[t]he skills of reading statutes and cases that lawyers learn in 
law school may be generally reliable ways of working out the impact of statutes and judicial decisions 
. . . without the need to consider moral considerations explicitly.” Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, 
supra note 1, at 1336. But if so, Greenberg has deflated the Moral Impact Theory itself, rendering it 
fairly superfluous and lacking in explanatory power. 
25. Id. at 1304. 
26. Id. at 1311. 
27. Id. at 1313. 
28. Id. at 1307 n.41. 
29. Id. at 1308. 
30. Id. 
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legal institutional action, including legally improper action. Were the 
legislature, for example, to direct everyone to adopt a particular solution, 
albeit in a procedurally flawed manner, which might or might not be 
challenged in the courts, wouldn’t there still be “moral reasons for 
following the solution that most other people are likely to follow”?31 
Either view depicts the direction in which the theoretical explanation 
of law’s content runs under the Moral Impact Theory. By contrast, in the 
usual understanding, named by Greenberg the “Standard Picture,”32 the 
court or legislature announces a norm, which, if determined in the right 
way and recognized as such within the legal institution, becomes a valid 
legal norm.33 Given moral reasons for obeying the law, the legal norm 
“ultimately gives rise to a genuine (moral) obligation.”34 The Moral 
Impact Theory’s reversal in the explanatory direction from that of the 
Standard Picture is the Theory’s genius. Greenberg is prone to begging the 
question, however, when, for example, he claims that “[i]t is intuitively 
clear” that an obligation motivated by animus or bent on morally 
iniquitous ends “is not a legal obligation, despite the fact that it is the 
result of actions of legal institutions.”35 The problem is that, quite the 
contrary, it is intuitively clear, it seems, that such obligations are legal but 
not moral. 
But Greenberg next attempts to ameliorate the theoretical tension in a 
very interesting way. He stakes out, as his underlying premise, the view 
that “a legal system, by its nature, is supposed to change the moral 
situation for the better.”36 Concomitantly, by virtue of what Greenberg 
styles the “bindingness hypothesis,”37 a legal system is supposed to 
 
 
31. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1312. From this angle, the relevant 
moral obligations changed or engendered by legal institutional action “are simply genuine, all-things-
considered, practical obligations,” which thereby constitute legal obligations. Id. at 1306. Greenberg 
allows that his theory is “a work in progress,” and notes his uncertainty whether the law’s content 
consists in such “bottom line” all-things-considered moral, hence legal, obligations, or rather pro tanto 
moral obligations. Id. at 1307 n.41. 
32. Id. at 1318; see Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 39. 
33. See, e.g., HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 97. 
34. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1319. 
35. Id. at 1322. 
36. Id.  
37. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 84; Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, 
supra note 1, at 1323 n.72. We cannot explore this hypothesis in depth here. However, Greenberg has 
not established the validity of its assumption that the law is supposed to generate all-things-considered 
moral obligations, or that it takes itself to do so. That law claims authority, or even peremptory 
authority, is not to say that it claims, or rests on, all-things-considered moral authoritativeness. 
Moreover, if Greenberg is correct that both legal theorists and practitioners take the Standard Picture 
for granted “extremely widely,” id. at 1296, 1297 n.19, and if he is further correct that the Standard 
Picture “leaves only a limited role that morality could play,” id. at 1299, then this further calls into 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/7
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generate all-things-considered binding obligations.38 Hence, actions by 
legal institutions that denigrate the moral system do not generate legal 
obligations; “legal obligations are not just any moral obligations that are 
created by the actions of legal institutions.”39 Those types of legal 
institutional actions will, at best, change the moral profile “paradoxically,” 
by generating moral obligations to “remedy, oppose, or otherwise mitigate 
the consequences of the action . . . .”40 This, however, is a “defective” way 
of generating obligations and not legally proper. Greenberg is now on 
firmer ground to restate the Moral Impact Theory, such that “[t]he content 
of law is that part of the moral profile created by the actions of legal 
institutions in the legally proper way.”41 
But which legal outcomes, or statutory or regulatory enactments, 
improve the moral system and which are deleterious? Is any particular 
action by a legal institution, focused narrowly on the litigants’ 
particularized interests, for the better or for the worse in relation to the 
larger good? These are the very questions that parties and litigants in their 
policy arguments, and interest groups and legislators in their 
representative guises, vigorously debate. The losers at any stage of the 
game believe that they have reasons to challenge the institution’s 
outcomes.42 Importantly, there is always opportunity to do so. And even 
apart from outcomes in specific controversies, norms and circumstances in 
the world change external to the legal system, spurring us to view standing 
institutional practices in a new light. What had seemed settled now loses 
some or much legitimacy, at least for various factions within the 
community. All of this is in the nature of a legal system, which necessarily 
includes rules of change.43 
A legal system would fail if it omitted settled rules of formal change 
or lacked ongoing practices, typically structures for argument, facilitating 
informal change.44 Participants engaged in practices aimed at changing the 
law will claim to be in pursuit of an improved moral situation, to the 
 
 
question his premise that, “[b]y the law’s lights, at least, legal obligations are all-things-considered 
[moral] obligations.” Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 94. 
38. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1323 n.72. 
39. Id. at 1321. 
40. Id. at 1322. 
41. Id. at 1323. 
42. See Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1322. 
43. See Jeremy Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition?, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION 
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 327, 330 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth E. Himma eds., 2009) 
(describing H. L. A. Hart’s view that “[a] rule of change is a secondary rule that empowers some 
person or institution to alter the law, either in general or in some particular respect, by following a 
certain procedure and conforming to certain requirements”). 
44. Id. at 349. 
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extent that moral language comes into play. But if legal institutional 
practice, via its argumentative structures, is on constant track “to remedy, 
oppose, or otherwise mitigate” the institutional status quo,45 then the 
Moral Impact Theory appears to embed the notion of defect within the 
concept of law. Put differently, if law’s content is provided in terms of 
moral impacts and moral obligations, demarcated between the genuine and 
the defective, with the justified impulse to alter outcomes signifying 
defect, then a legal system’s normal and proper functioning is at once 
legally proper and defective.46 
That a theory generates or rests on paradox gives reason to pause and 
consider the theory’s soundness.47 The paradox just suggested is that, 
under the Moral Impact Theory (or so it seems), if the system is not 
working as it should then it is defective, and if the system is working as it 
should then it is also defective. The very act of reckoning moral impacts in 
relation to the legal obligations that follow threatens a sort of Buridan’s 
dilemma, wherein the moral agent is stuck midway between two 
interpretations.48 But legal officials and subjects act continually, and 
change the law daily, perhaps suggesting that they are not engaged in any 
such reckoning. 
Greenberg himself counts a claimed theoretical impediment to 
adjudication against the theory at issue. His reliance on the Supreme Court 
opinion in Smith v. United States49 is illustrative.50 Smith having offered to 
 
 
45. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1322. 
46. This paradox should count as a hybrid epistemic and semantic dilemma, resting on our 
inability to know, or at least the impracticability of understanding, what we actual mean when we 
speak of moral impacts and defectively engendered obligations. For his part, Greenberg has offered a 
related objection to the Standard Picture such that, if this view is true, then law, by its nature is 
“doomed to be defective.” Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 104. He bases this 
conclusion on his presupposition that, by its nature, law treats legal obligations as morally binding in 
the all-things-considered sense. Id. at 95. Yet there is “widespread consensus” that such a condition is 
not satisfied by particularized or “piecemeal” authoritative pronouncements of actually existing legal 
institutions, being “the governments of contemporary nations.” Id. at 81, 96, 100. Greenberg has not 
made the case, however, that the “standard” view (in its positivist manifestation) would deem an 
ongoing “defect”—such that moral obligations “almost invariably diverge from the content of the 
authoritative pronouncements,” id. at 102—to be a problem for that view. So long as a legal system 
maintains sufficient legitimacy to endure, wouldn’t the sort of defect stated by Greenberg be 
problematic in precisely the way positivist legal theory claims? 
47. Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of 
Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1830 (2005); see generally David G. Carlson, Legal 
Positivism and Russell’s Paradox, 5 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 257, 277 (2013) (claiming that Russell’s 
paradox “defeats positivist jurisprudence”). 
48. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, 5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL: TOWARD 
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA, 1905–1908, at 798 (Gregory H. Moore ed., 2014). 
49. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
50. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1291. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol11/iss2/7
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trade a gun for cocaine, the question was whether he was properly 
sentenced under a statute increasing the penalties if the defendant 
“uses . . . a firearm” in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.51 
Greenberg summons Smith to show the peccability of the Standard 
Picture’s resort to linguistic content. Two competing ways of 
understanding the linguistic content of the statute in Smith leave “no way 
of adjudicating,” according to Greenberg.52 This is because the text’s 
“semantic content,” approximating what is conventionally encoded in the 
language, requires that the court penalize any use of the firearm, whereas 
its “communicative content” points in the opposite direction by 
approximating what the legislature likely intended to communicate.53 
Greenberg says that, in accord with widespread practice, both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Smith assumed the Standard Picture 
without pause.54 Yet the Smith majority did indeed decide the case, 
holding that Smith had “used” the firearm “precisely” in a manner 
contemplated by the statute.55 If the Standard Picture’s commitments leave 
“no way of adjudicating,” however, then Greenberg inaccurately describes 
legal practice. If the court departed from the Standard Picture for purposes 
of resolving the case, then perhaps it applied moral considerations, or 
perhaps the Justices engaged in a nonmoral disagreement. The opinion’s 
text itself suggests the latter, an inquiry akin to what Hart had in mind 
when he described adjudicative analysis as concerning whether “a 
person’s case falls under the rule.”56  
Were actors in the legal system gauging moral impacts, and were such 
impacts the ground of law’s decision theory, a further metaphor might be 
apt, via Schrödinger.57 This is because any particular actions occurring in 
the legal system may be described as leading simultaneously to moral 
improvement, at least from one point of view, and deleterious impacts, at 
least from another. Nor might we be in a position to discern which is 
 
 
51. 508 U.S. at 226–37. 
52. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1292. 
53. Id. at 1291–92. It should be noted that Greenberg’s oppositional account of “semantic” 
versus “communicative” content—the notion that these “point in opposite directions,” id. at 1292—
misconstrues the significance of the former notion. Both interpretations carry what Greenberg is 
labeling “semantic” content, which is a constant, whereas what he terms “communicative” content 
attempts a pragmatic narrowing of the expression’s meaning as would better fit the situation or 
context. 
54. Id. at 1291. 
55. 508 U.S. at 241. 
56. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 88 (emphasis added). 
57, See Erwin Schrödinger, The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of 
Schrödinger’s “Cat Paradox” Paper, 124 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 323 (John D. Trimmer trans., 1980) 
(1935). 
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which; certain thinkers “take no position on whether it is sometimes, 
always or never codified, in the sense of being ‘before the mind,’ when a 
moral judgment is made.”58 
There are even more complex epistemic problems lurking. Whereas 
the Moral Impact Theory rests on practical, first-order normative 
assessments, the road to assembling a “moral profile,” and to assigning 
normative values to certain actions and circumstances, suggests the need 
for a prior, higher-order examination of where those principles come from 
and what they mean. If law is constituted by moral impacts, and if law’s 
interpretive mission is to resolve conflicts between competing first-order 
moral considerations, then it should seem reasonable to try to settle on a 
shared view of morality at the outset. Michael Smith has well defended the 
view, shared generally among moral philosophers, that “we should begin 
our study of ethics by focusing on meta-ethics, not normative ethics. For 
we cannot hope to do normative ethics without first knowing what the 
standards of correct argument in normative ethics are, and it is in meta-
ethics that we discover those standards.”59 
Once we begin to look at the Moral Impact Theory from the 
metaethical point of view, additional conundrums arise that are simply 
foreign to legal analysis and to theoretical jurisprudence. Under the 
Theory, when the legal institution acts, this alters the morally relevant 
background circumstances, and generates corresponding moral 
obligations.60 Discerning those obligations requires moral judgment. 
Writing from the Kantian perspective, Barbara Herman explains that 
actions altering the moral agent’s circumstances present the agent with “a 
deliberative problem whose resolution leaves her obliged to act as 
deliberation directs.”61 Yet institutionalizing any such deliberative 
problem presupposes some recognition of the standards or criteria upon 
which we deliberate. 
Hence, once law’s content is defined to consist in the moral impacts of 
the actions of legal institutions, litigants, jurists and scholars are motivated 
to engage in prolonged metaethical discourse and dispute and, indeed, 
may be obligated to do so. Which theory of morality, in other words, 
should we adopt before even reaching the question of what moral impacts 
have resulted from legal institutional action?62  
 
 
58. Frank Jackson et al., Ethical particularism and patterns, in MORAL PARTICULARISM 79, 91 
(B. Hooker & M. O. Little eds., 2000). 
59. MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 14 (1994). 
60. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1318. 
61. BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 177 (1996). 
62. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the 
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Likely sensing this objection as well, Greenberg may be correct in 
stating that “[t]alk of genuine obligations does not presuppose any 
particular metaethical view . . . .”63 While we may talk of genuine 
obligations without arriving at a higher-order commitment, however, law 
would have every incentive to incorporate metaethical discourse into its 
argumentative structures under the Moral Impact Theory. A noncognitive 
norm-expressivist view, for example, might pull in the direction of 
empirical assessment of community norms in support of litigant 
positions,64 whereas a cognitive moral realism might counsel engaging 
expert witnesses in moral philosophy to hash out objective moral realities. 
In sum, metaethics would have practical relevance to legal practice 
under a theory of law rooted in moral impacts. One theorist, for instance, 
discusses the metaethical question of whether morality rests on moral 
principles or something else, such as simply being the sort of person “who 
sees situations in a certain distinctive way.”65 She puts it this way: 
[T]he question of whether morality can and should be principle-
based has important practical implications. If the predominance of 
moral principles in normative theory and our everyday life were to 
turn out to be no more than an unjustified prejudice in favor of 
principles, hospital ethics committees, for example, would have to 
reconsider seriously the methods by which they reach and justify 
their decisions.66 
 
 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 801 (1997) (stating that, “[f]or example, both 
[John Hart] Ely and [Robert] Bork advance a metaethical, analytic argument against decisions such as 
Roe [v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] and Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)]”); see also 
Heidi M. Hurd, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1417, 1418 (1988) (arguing that “American jurisprudence has been hostage to the thesis that the truth 
of moral judgments is relative to the shared sentiments of discrete communities”); Jason C. Glahn, 
Marching to Zion: Can (And Should) We Transform International Law with Moral Theory?, 38 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 477, 480 (2006) (stating, regarding the “claim that there is no objective basis for 
morality itself,” that “[t]his metaethical challenge has been employed with great effect against those 
who urge the use of moral principles to decide cases”). 
63. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1308 n.43. 
64. See ALAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT 
292 (1990). 
65. MAIKE ALBERTZART, MORAL PRINCIPLES ix (Bloomsbury Ethics 2014). 
66. Id. at x–xi; see also Thomas M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, reprinted in 
MORAL DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 267, 270 (Stephen Darwall et 
al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (explaining that “[t]he adoption of a philosophical thesis about the 
nature of morality will almost always have some effect on the plausibility of particular moral claims”) 
(emphasis added). 
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From the point of view of moral philosophy, the metaethical scene “is 
remarkably rich and diverse,”67 but this does practical jurists no favors as 
they navigate law’s argumentative structure. 
II. THE MORAL IMPACT THEORY’S MISTAKEN VIEW OF LAW’S 
ARGUMENTATIVE STRUCTURE 
Whether our institutional focus is that of morality or something else, 
we are burdened by the need to know how to proceed and what the rules of 
the game are. Legal practice integrates higher-level assumptions and 
understandings about how law is done. Even if law’s mostly backward-
looking argumentative structure is morally motivated or justified, as may 
be the case, we can infer from practice that the jurist knows, by virtue of a 
higher-order understanding, to conscientiously engage with the argument 
in nonmoral terms.68 
Most practitioners, officials, and theorists should agree about the 
phenomena—the oft-stated doctrines and recurring principles—toward 
which legal practice is ordinarily directed. Although they will diverge in 
saying what those doctrines and principles reveal about legality in 
particular cases, and about other aspects of law’s nature, they also share an 
understanding about law’s argumentative structures, which vary in 
familiar ways depending on whether the context is judicial, legislative, 
regulatory, and so forth. This Part attempts to show that, whatever the 
moral implications of particular outcomes, our best explanation of legal 
deliberative work, at least in the judicial sphere, rests on the law’s 
nonmoral argumentative fabric. 
  
 
 
67. Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends, reprinted in MORAL 
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 3, 7 (Stephen Darwall et al. eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1997). This volume includes illustrative cognitivist and noncognitivist 
metatheories. See also BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 17 (1985) 
(asking, “[i]f there is such a thing as the truth about the subject matter of ethics—the truth, we might 
say, about the ethical—why is there any expectation that it should be simple?”). 
68. See, e.g., Gregory B. David, Dworkin, Precedent, Confidence, and Roe v. Wade, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (2004) (explaining that “[s]econd-order legal principles provide reasons for 
how a judge should balance one first-order principle in relation to others. That is, a second-order 
principle suggests how a judge should weigh first-order principles”); Kenji Yoshino, Note, What’s 
Past is Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Law, 104 YALE L. J. 471, 503 (1994) (noting the 
“metalegal discussion of stare decisis” in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
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A. The Mistaken Moral View 
We begin by looking at Greenberg’s view of legal interpretation. He 
lays out three possible understandings. The first is that of the Standard 
Picture, which asks, “what is the linguistic content of the legal texts?”69 
On this approach, which encompasses what the legal authority’s 
pronouncements mean as both a semantic and pragmatic matter, says 
Greenberg,70 there is “little or no role for moral reasoning,” unless the 
texts explicitly use moral terms, or perhaps when officials seek to fill in 
gaps in the existing legal norms.71 
Motivating Greenberg’s rejection of the Standard Picture is the salient 
need to translate legal institutional actions and pronouncements into legal 
obligations, powers, privileges, and so on, these constituting law’s content. 
For Greenberg, the Standard Picture does not adequately make this move, 
because it presupposes that legal pronouncements directly and 
linguistically communicate obligations, rather than indirectly changing 
them.72 The problem, Greenberg says, is that “[a] move from a text’s 
meaning to the existence of certain legal obligations requires argument.”73 
Because law’s goals are heavily imbued with moral considerations—
furthering justice, advancing democratic principles, ensuring fairness and 
fostering legitimacy74—legal argument is best seen as rooted in moral 
reasoning, which is complex and controversial.75 The Standard Picture, 
however, appealing to the linguistic, communicative content of those 
pronouncements, thereby paints a picture of law’s argumentative structure 
that wrongly elides this complexity and controversy.76 
  
 
 
69. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1302. 
70. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 48; see Thomas R. Lee, Judging 
Ordinary Meaning, 127 Yale L. J. 788, 815 (2018) (discussing the distinction between “‘semantics, 
which is concerned with the context-independent meaning of words, phrases, and sentences, and 
pragmatics, which involves the meaning of utterances in particular contexts’”) (quoting Richard 
Fallon, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2015)). 
71. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1302, n.33. 
72. Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of 
Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217, 219 
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) [hereinafter Greenberg, Legal Interpretation]. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 256. 
75. Id. at 226. 
76. Id.; see also id. at 230 (saying that “[a] central theme of the communication theorists is that 
the philosophy of language can cut through the confused debates of legal theorists and tell us what 
constitutes the content of the law”). 
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The second understanding of legal interpretation recognized by 
Greenberg is Dworkin’s, by whose account lawyers and judges grapple 
with the issue of which outcome-determinative principles best fit and 
justify the prior legal materials.77 Greenberg objects, however, that, “[a]t 
least in general, a straightforward appeal to which interpretation yields a 
morally better standard does not seem permissible in legal 
interpretation.”78 Asking which principle would, ex ante, be the best seems 
divorced from the workings of legal practice.79 
Moreover, the project by which law’s content is determined by 
reference to principles that best fit and justify existing practice accepts, as 
the given data set, actual and often “severely morally flawed” practices 
that should not be followed.80 Greenberg explains that Dworkin’s evolving 
positions consistently appeared to “rule out in principle the possibility of 
legal obligations that the courts and similar institutions—because of, e.g., 
their institutional limitations, their relations with other branches of 
government, and the like—should not enforce.”81 He sees an 
unsatisfactory circularity in Dworkin’s view deriving legal content from 
enforcement obligations, emphasizing that an account of law should help 
explain why courts ought to enforce some rights and not others.82 
Rejecting the Standard Picture and the Dworkinian account, 
Greenberg outlines a third way in which to comprehend legal 
interpretation. By the Moral Impact Theory, legal interpretation rests on 
moral reasoning about what is normatively required as a consequence of 
the actions taken by lawmaking institutions.83 Further, what is morally 
required is not a matter of what the legal texts say on their face or mean in 
pragmatic contextual terms, although such linguistic content may be “one 
relevant consideration in the calculation of the moral impact of the 
actions.”84 
However innovative and influential in the law-as-morality project, 
Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory is problematic. Part II showed that, to 
the extent the Moral Impact Theory posits a morals-based epistemic 
 
 
77. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1303; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE 66–67 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]. 
78. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1293. 
79. Id. (stating “[t]hus, we ask not which rule is morally better ex ante, but which moral 
obligations, powers, and so on (if any) the legislature actually succeeded in bringing about”). 
80. Id. at 1302. 
81. Id. at 1300 n.28. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1303. 
84. Id.; see also Greenberg, Legal Interpretation, supra note 72, at 251 (more extremely 
claiming that “legislatures need not intend to communicate anything by enacting a bill”). 
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vantage point, the Theory is necessarily suspect. This Part, in turn, seeks 
to establish that Greenberg’s depiction of the role and nature of legal 
interpretation does not comport with actual legal practice. If so, this should 
pose a significant problem for the Moral Impact Theory, since Greenberg 
purports to find strong evidentiary support for the Theory in “the way in 
which lawyers, judges, and law practitioners work out what the law is [in] 
actual practice . . . .”85 
Some further background on the moral view of legal argumentative 
practice should be helpful. Greenberg himself has noted Dworkin’s 
“argument from theoretical disagreement” in opposition to legal 
positivism.86 If positivism requires that the criteria of legality are fixed by 
a convergent social practice on the part of legal officials, and if theoretical 
disagreement in law nevertheless appears to occur somewhat frequently, 
then legal officials do not converge on, or engage in, a social practice that 
fixes the criteria of legality. The explanation is likely to be, according to 
Dworkin, that legal practice is connected to deliberation over moral 
assessments, which are typically controversial and subject to widespread 
disagreement.87 Dworkin did regard theoretical disagreement in law as 
endemic, and this view supported his nonpositivist theory of law.88  
Greenberg’s challenge to the Standard Picture is a bit different. Rather 
than giving an argument for law’s content from theoretical disagreement, 
Greenberg’s is an argument from law’s content to moral deliberation and 
disagreement.89 He views the interpreter, being the legal official or 
practitioner, as assessing the moral impacts of the legal data, texts, and 
activities, and then engaging in a moral exercise weighing competing 
considerations that arise from conflicting interpretations.90 Holding his 
theory out as a reflection of the “actual practice” occurring in the legal 
 
 
85. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 72; Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, 
supra note 1, at 1325–37 (using case decisions to illustrate the ways in which legal interpretation by 
practitioners “involves working out the moral consequence of the relevant facts”). 
86. Mark Greenberg, Principles of Legal Interpretation, at Part IX, 51 (2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) [hereinafter Greenberg, Principles], http://philosophy.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Principles-of-Legal-Interpretation-2016.pdf. 
87. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 7–8. 
88. Id.  
89. Greenberg, Principles, supra note 86, at Part III, p. 22 (suggesting that “debates over legal 
interpretation can only be resolved, in the end, by addressing the fundamental issue of how the content 
of the law is determined”). 
90. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1330. Greenberg’s view of legal 
interpretation, in contrast to Dworkin’s, flows from his understanding that, for the Moral Impact 
Theory, “the law is downstream of the legal practices; on Dworkin’s theory, by contrast, the law is 
upstream of the legal practices.” Id. at 1301. 
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system91—or what would otherwise be the correct interpretive practice—
Greenberg as a practical matter concurs with Dworkin that law’s 
argumentative structure is rooted in the sort of moral disagreement 
Dworkin and others label “theoretical.”92 
However, the idea that law’s argumentative practice is centered on the 
resolution of moral conflicts is not only unlikely, but counter to the 
perhaps typically indifferent and sometimes hostile response with which 
legal officials greet efforts at moral argument. Although the empirical 
matter cannot be resolved here, it has appeared to be the case that judges 
deciding cases are not overly receptive to moral claims, and that they 
seldom claim moral superiority for the legal doctrines they apply. In 
contract law, for instance, courts hold that “moral obligations do not give 
rise to contractual liability.”93 In tort law, mere moral responsibility does 
not give rise to legal liability.94 Moral obligation—arising from official 
state conduct or otherwise—doesn’t impart a legal duty, nor does a moral 
lapse signify a breach of duty.95 Judges are sometimes inclined to show 
disdain for moral argument, deeming this to indicate the lack of a 
compelling legal position.96 Courts have said, “A mere moral 
consideration is nothing.”97 
While courts may be unaware of a ground underlying their decision-
making, it would be quite odd for them to be indifferent or openly hostile 
when presented with the type of reasoning that ought to ring true. Perhaps 
Greenberg might respond that judges so reacting have been presented with 
the wrong sort of moral reasoning, one such as Dworkin’s claiming that a 
certain outcome would best justify existing materials and hence be morally 
best. Yet it seems intuitively quite unlikely that a practitioner’s argument 
that the law is a moral impact, merely influenced by but not embodied in 
the relevant linguistic precedent, would be well received.  
  
 
 
91. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 72. 
92. See Steven Schaus, How to Think About Law as Morality: A Comment on Greenberg and 
Hershovitz, 124 YALE L. J. FORUM 224, 225 (2015). 
93. Steele v. Isikoff, 130 F. Supp.2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2000). 
94. See, e.g., Petrosky v. Embry Crossing Condominium Ass’n, 643 S.E.2d 855, 860 (Ga. App. 
2007) (“Wade’s statement as the agent of the alleged tortfeasor can be considered, at best, an 
acceptance of moral responsibility, because . . . the Association has no liability.”). 
95. E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Grossman, 96 So.2d 917, 920–21 (Fla. App. 2012) 
(finding a husband has no legal duty to prevent his wife from smoking). 
96. E.g., Manwill v. Oyler, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 1961) (“[I]f a mere moral, as distinguished 
from a legal, obligation were recognized as valid consideration for a contract, that would practically 
erode to the vanishing point the necessity for finding a consideration.”).  
97. Musick v. Dodson, 76 Mo. 624, 626 (1882) (quoting Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501). 
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This article contends that law’s institutional nature better explains its 
argumentative structure, and in nonmoral terms. There is a sense in which 
it seems right to say that law’s present content, governing the new case, 
might differ from what was stated or prescribed on the face of the statutes 
or prior decisions, or what was actually intended as a psychological fact. 
Inherent in legal interpretation as practiced, however, is usually the inquiry 
into the relevance of the text as linguistically presented, and what the 
author intended. Because that inquiry concerns the extent to which prior 
institutional pronouncements are sufficiently “directed at” the present 
circumstances, and whether they provide a solution to the new matter with 
sufficient exactness,98 the exercise does not immerse in moral 
disagreement. 
Although we will not now wrestle directly with how this view may 
inform the ontological question of what makes something the law, we can 
at the least suggest that such a concept, informed by this article’s view of 
law’s argumentative structure, would derive from a legal institutional 
phenomenon that might be labeled “interventionist” interpretation.99 This 
would mean that law’s content is in flux, a proposition with which 
Greenberg would agree. But pace Greenberg, interpreters find the law “to 
date” in the legal texts and pronouncements, as best they can interpret 
these materials. If the pre-existing texts do not, as they rarely do, clearly or 
precisely match the new situation—because no two cases are precisely 
alike, and owing to the open texture of natural language – then the 
interpretive attitude intervenes to resolve the new matter. Unlike 
constructive interpretation in Dworkin’s jurisprudence, however, 
interventionist interpretation is open to extralegal considerations. 
The inquiry, however, is not dryly focused non-contextually on the 
linguistic content of the words used in the pre-existing legal materials. The 
Smith case, Greenberg’s counterpoint to the Standard Picture,100 poses no 
problem for an interventionist interpretive view, which asks in a generally 
Hartian manner whether the statutory language was sufficiently directed 
at, or intended to cover, the new situation, and whether it did so with 
 
 
98. See Alani Golanski, Nonmoral Theoretical Disagreement in Law, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE 
L. REV. 225, 251 (2016). 
99. See Hal Foster, Smash the Screen, 40 LONDON REV. BOOKS, Apr. 5, 2018, at 40 (reviewing 
HITO STEYERL, DUTY FREE ART: ART IN THE AGE OF PLANETARY CIVIL WAR (2017)). As Karl Popper 
put it, “all observation involves interpretation in light of theories.” KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 295 (8th ed. 1994) (1972). Interpretation is itself 
theoretical, then, and one way of putting this might be to say that the interpreter intervenes from her 
own theoretical vantage point. 
100. See supra notes 49–56, and accompanying text. 
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sufficient specificity.101 The court was able to adjudicate by considering 
the pragmatic elements of the existing linguistic data.102 For Greenberg, 
“[a] pragmatic content is one that a speaker conveys without encoding it, 
for example by taking advantage of background knowledge that is shared 
by the speaker and the audience.”103 
Because pragmatic linguistic content assesses the contexts of 
utterances, including the speaker’s inferred (not encoded) intent, there 
should be a great deal of overlap between assessing pragmatic content and 
the precedential intentionality exercise discussed in this Part. The 
controversy in Smith seemed pretty clearly to center on this sort of 
linguistic dispute.104 Although Greenberg demands more, and faults the 
justices for not explaining their competing interpretive exercises on the 
basis of underlying moral values,105 the court’s practice appears to have 
conformed to institutional decision-making and judicial finality norms. 
In this regard, as an alternative to Greenberg’s model, we next 
summarize a view that begins with the legal system’s institutional status, 
and its direct handling of legal data. We will later, in Part V, transition to 
an understanding of how the actions of legal institutions do engender 
significant moral impacts that inform decision-making exercises, within 
both the legal system and the larger community. Although legal 
institutional actions morally impact legal officials by informing their 
moral obligations, this dynamic alone does not lend credence to the 
theoretical construct by which law’s content is that moral impact, and 
Greenberg does not claim otherwise. 
B. The Apt Nonmoral View 
Greenberg voices no qualms about the notion that a legal system is a 
socially created institutional construct. Nevertheless, he has not trained his 
sights on the constraints that follow from this premise, or from the further 
premise that, as an institution, law must abide an institutional logic.106 Yet 
 
 
101. Compare 508 U.S. at 228 (asserting that, “[o]f course, § 924(c)(1) is not limited to those 
cases in which a gun is used”) and id. at 235 (remarking that “[t]he evident care with which Congress 
chose the language of § 924(d)(1) reinforces our conclusion in this regard”), with id. at 245 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“I have no doubt that the ‘use’ referred to is only use as a sporting weapon”); see also 
JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION 151–52 
(2010) [hereinafter SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD]. 
102. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
103. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 48 n.9. 
104. 508 U.S. at 234–35. 
105. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1329–30. 
106. An alternative view has been that there is no logical structure to the social world, and hence 
that the logic of any particular human field, such as law, is autonomous and irreducible, not derivative 
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these straight-forward postulates arguably pull in a direction different from 
the one Greenberg has charted. 
Institutions begin, as a logical matter, with the assignment to persons 
or objects of functions that will have to be recognized by the collective.107 
The assignment need not be verbal or effectuated by an overt exercise of 
power, but rather can begin with social practices that evolve in a certain 
way, such that “X counts as Y in context C.”108 Vanguard work in the field 
of social ontology, including institutional philosophy, illustrates the 
foundational assignment of a status function, by imagining early humans 
who build a wall around their territory. Over time, the wall erodes leaving 
only a line of stones on the ground. Now, however, rather than a wall 
functioning to keep neighbors out by virtue of its physical characteristics, 
the larger community collectively recognizes and accepts the boundary 
symbolized by the line of stones. A normative reality, unique to human 
culture, has emerged separate and apart from the physicality of the entities 
involved.109 
Understanding social behavior splits from the study of other natural 
phenomena by virtue of human symbolic and, when more sophisticated, 
linguistic allocations of duties and powers. As one thinker has opined, “the 
pioneers in this effort have been not the cosmologists who belatedly 
shifted their gaze from the heavens to the human community but rather . . . 
the law-makers who were confronted by the predicaments of human 
society.”110 Over time, humans creating or sustaining institutional reality, 
 
 
of the logic of the broader institutional class of entities. See Gunter Gebauer, Habitus, Intentionality, 
and Social Rules: A Controversy Between Searle and Bourdieu, 29 SUBSTANCE 93, 76 (2000). I 
believe the concept of a “social ontology” is sensible, however, and hence that recent insights into 
institutional logic provide valuable resources for the theory of legal institutions. See Steven Lukes, 
Searle Versus Durkheim, in INTENTIONAL ACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTS: ESSAYS ON JOHN 
SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 191, 193 (Savas L. Tsohatzidis ed., 2010) (noting the critique of 
theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, that they “failed to see how institutional facts ‘require linguistic or 
symbolic modes of representation or they cannot exist’”) (quoting John R. Searle, Searle Versus 
Durkheim and the Waves of Thought: Reply to Gross, 6 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 1, 65 (2006)); 
see generally RAIMO TUOMELA, SOCIAL ONTOLOGY: COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND GROUP 
AGENTS 226 (2013) (stating that “[a]n institution is a group phenomenon involving two key elements, 
constitutive norms and a social practice, where the norms confer an institutional (symbolic, social, and 
normative) status to the activity or to some item involved in the practice”); MARGARET GILBERT, ON 
SOCIAL FACTS 430–31 (1989) (advocating for an “ontological holism” according to which “social 
groups are plural subjects”). 
107. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 69 (1995) [hereinafter, SEARLE, 
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY]. 
108. See Andrei Marmor, What’s Left of General Jurisprudence? On Law’s Ontology and 
Content 10, (Cornell Law School Research Paper 18-26, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3165550. 
109. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 107, at 39–40. 
110. DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 2 (1990). 
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and increasingly sophisticated legal systems, rely upon their speech acts in 
a more self-conscious exercise of power, namely, by virtue of their 
assignments of “status functions.”111 
Group members develop an evaluative attitude and justified 
expectations that others will adhere to the status functions that structure 
their social system. This is the way in which paper, for example, can 
function as a financial device. Individuals participating in the institution 
need not take the internal point of view, they need not collectively accept, 
approve of, or endorse the status-function assignments, so long as they 
collectively recognize the functional arrangements.112 Tyrants and ruling 
social classes can hijack institutions, but even transactions permeated with 
fear and loathing are sustained when there is, at the least, some minimum 
level of cooperative intention by which participants collectively recognize 
the continued existence of assigned rights and obligations.113 
A fully functional institutional system is thereby comprised of a web 
of role assignments, most of which are status functions iterated on top of 
other status functions. A human being at the brute physical level, for 
instance, is assigned the status of resident or citizen when certain 
conditions are fulfilled. She may become a student, and then a lawyer, 
when other conditions are fulfilled, and the lawyer might then become a 
judge. At each stage, the individual is assigned a status as the carrier of 
certain deontic powers—both positive, such as rights and authority, and 
negative, such as duties and obligations.114 
When we exercise power through our speech acts as a means of 
creating or sustaining institutions, those speech acts must have an 
intentional, or propositional, content.115 This simply means that the 
exercise of power must be about, or “directed at,” something.116 Although 
individuals may exercise power over others without necessarily 
 
 
111. SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 107, at 123–24. In this way, 
institutional facts are made true or false by virtue of collective intentionality and are thus observer 
relative. Their functional properties are thereby ontologically subjective, even as they are, at the same 
time, epistemologically objective. 
112. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1485 (2006). 
113. See RAIMO TUOMELA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIALITY: THE SHARED POINT OF VIEW 173 
(2007) (describing a collective commitment whereby group members, functioning in a “we-mode,” are 
“disposed to cooperate if the others do and to correct, sanction, and punish those who do not 
cooperate”). 
114. See SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 107, at 125. 
115. See generally Glenn R. Butterton, Signals, Threats, and Deterrence: Alive and Well in the 
Taiwan Strait, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 73–74 (1997). 
116. Frederick I. Dretske, The Intentionality of Cognitive States, 5 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 281 
(1980), reprinted in THE NATURE OF MIND 354, 354 (David M. Rosenthal ed., 1991). 
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considering the consequences, participants in the institution will at the 
least interpret that exercise of power by virtue of an “intentionality 
constraint,” gauging what they deem the exercise to be about.117 
Moreover, for institutional participants to recognize what may be 
expected of them, the intentional content of the power relations will have 
to be sufficiently specified, an interpretive parameter labeled the 
“exactness” constraint.118 Participants in the institution must be capable of 
knowing, although they need not actually know, what is expected of them, 
and more generally what status functions have been assigned.119 A similar 
dynamic characterizes participation in legal institutional systems. 
Greenberg’s view of the content of law, expressed in his earlier work, 
rejects the notion of legal rules, because these reside in the content of 
authoritative pronouncements, which Greenberg rejects as constitutive of 
law.120 For the new philosophical work in social ontology, however, which 
has been an outgrowth of longer-standing philosophies of mind, language 
and consciousness, rules remain central in understanding the logic of 
institutions. Hence, an institution must be constituted by rules that permit 
the individuals, entities or objects involved to “count as” having a certain 
significance and status within the institution. A rule creating the landlords’ 
right to evict tenants invests them with a status by which they wield 
certain powers of eviction, and makes this the case by representing it as 
being the case.121 
Although rules and principles are interpreted and applied in cases, 
future actors inevitably disagree about whether certain contingencies have 
been addressed, whether, that is, the prior resolutions are “directed at” the 
present case. Alternatively, the future actors may view the prior case as 
settling certain aspects of the new affair, but not others. The entity charged 
 
 
117. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 101, at 151; Michael J. Thompson, 
Collective Intentionality, Social Domination, and Reification, 3 J. SOC. ONTOLOGY 207, 223 (2017). 
118. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 101, at 152. 
119. Id. at 152. Of course, participants in an institution need not “discuss” power even when 
exercising or being affected by it. However, status functions must be assigned with sufficient 
exactness to render such a discussion possible in a “satisfactory” way. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, SOME 
MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 127 (1929) (“[T]he law must be applied by men engaged in 
practical affairs and by so many of them that to be useful legal doctrine must be capable of being 
understood and stated by men who are neither profound scholars nor interested in abstract thought”). 
120. See Mark Greenberg, The Prism of Rules 42, 48 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1042121 (acknowledging that if the Moral Impact 
Theory, then called the “Dependence View,” is true, “then there are no legal rules”). 
121. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 101, at 97 (explaining that the 
“constitutive rule” takes the form of a “standing declaration,” such that the declaration by its very 
nature and function constructs the reality, as, for example, an official declaration that “the oldest 
surviving son counts as the new king” makes it the case that the oldest surviving son is the new king). 
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with interpretation, typically the court, will usually discern a minimal 
content that has previously been determined with sufficient specificity, 
and the litigants’ dissent will not gain traction. Beyond that, the parties to 
a legal event may disagree, and when their interests differ such that they 
aspire toward conflicting outcomes, they will typically disagree. 
Litigants dispute how linguistic factors and social circumstances 
inform the determination about what was intended by the earlier outcomes, 
and toward which situations this preexisting legal data are directed. On a 
parallel plain, the arguments attempt to train the court’s attention on 
competing factors for determining whether the earlier outcomes address 
the present circumstance with sufficient specificity. These are the 
dynamics that primarily account for law’s argumentative structure, 
characterized by nonmoral disagreements that are typical and widespread 
in adjudication. Nor do these inquiries require an excavation of the actual 
intent driving prior judicial or legislative actions. Apart from the 
impracticability of reckoning prior collective intent, legal interpretation, 
on a compelling view, aims to understand what intentions may now be 
deemed to have been intended then, based on knowledge of the contextual 
setting of the pronouncement, the historical evidence, and the relevant 
communicative norms.122 
As described,123 Professor Hart sensed this point. For him, “the whole 
distinctive style of human thought, speech, and action which is involved in 
the existence of rules and which constitutes the normative structure of 
society” centered on the inquiry whether “a person’s case falls under the 
rule.”124 The notion of “falling under” the prior pronouncements is close to 
what we are getting at. We can reasonably surmise that reasoning from 
“precedent” and analogy reflects the nature of human thought as well as 
legal practice, serving our interests in both efficiency and coherence. Hart 
did not, however, have at his disposal an analytic description of the logic 
of legal institutions that allowed him to appreciate the intentionality and 
 
 
122. See ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 19 (2014) (adopting the view that the 
assertive content of an utterance “must be defined objectively as the kind of content that a reasonable 
hearer, with full knowledge of the contextual background of the speech, would understand the speaker 
to have intended to convey, given what the speaker expressed, the relevant contextual knowledge, and 
the relevant conversational norms that apply”); see also Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living 
Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 829 (2012). One way to more accessibly illustrate the point is 
to consider the classical hypothetical statute prohibiting “vehicles” from entering the park, the present 
adjudication involving a newly invented gadget, perhaps a sort of hybrid electric bicycle. As a more 
general example, courts often consider competing interpretations of what the legislators should now be 
deemed to have intended based on the likely “fundamental” or “salutary” purposes of the existing 
provision. Thomsen v. Mercer-Charles, 901 A.2d 303, 309 (N.J. 2006). 
123.   See supra note 56, and accompanying text. 
124.   HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 88 (emphasis added). 
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exactness constraints that regularly and naturally generate nonmoral 
dispute from within law’s apparatus. 
The nonmoral view of law’s argumentative structure better explains 
the nature of legal practice than does Greenberg’s or Dworkin’s morality-
based theories. Consider, for instance, the most celebrated of Dworkin’s 
practical examples,125 the judicial disagreement occurring in the case of 
Riggs v. Palmer.126 
Even in Riggs, in which Elmer had murdered his grandfather in order 
to gain his inheritance, the outcome-determinative disagreement did not 
center on the moral issue. The entire appellate panel agreed that morality 
would frustrate Elmer’s scheme. The judges disputed whether the case 
should be decided in accord with the morally required outcome. They 
struggled to delimit their theoretical disagreement to the standard by 
which to weigh the presumed collective intention of the legislators against 
the precision of their statutory language regulating the making of 
testamentary documents.127 
Even for the limited range of cases arising from the unsettled 
construction of constitutional or statutory clauses, in which different 
interpretive methodologies are available, the issues over which the 
litigants argue and which command the court’s attention will in the first 
instance home in on the extent to which prior legal assertions and 
stipulations are directed at the present set of circumstances.128 Owing to its 
institutional logic, the legal system’s argumentative structure plausibly 
locates the controversy in nonmoral standards advanced by each side for 
determining whether the existing legal materials fit and hence control or 
guide the new matter, rather than in a network of conflicting moral 
obligations those pronouncements may have engendered.129 
 
 
125.   DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 15–20. 
126.    22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
127.   Compare 22 N.E. at 190 (majority panel asking “[w] hat could be more unreasonable than 
to suppose that it was the legislative intention in the general laws passed for the orderly, peaceable, 
and just devolution of property that they should have operation in favor of one who murdered his 
ancestor that he might speedily come into the possession of his estate?”) with 22 N.E. at 191 
(dissenting judges stressing that “the legislature has by its enactments prescribed exactly when and 
how wills may be made, altered, and revoked”).  
128. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Oakland, No. C 07-3885 CW, 2008 WL 1901005, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal., Apr. 28, 2008) (“Plaintiff . . . urges the Court to apply an interpretation of the Commerce Clause 
based on the original intent of the framers of the Constitution. Even if the Court were inclined to adopt 
such an interpretation, however, it is not free to disregard established precedent”); Lowery v. 
Haithcock, 79 S.E.2d 204, 208–09 (N.C. 1953) (“Our former decisions have liberalized the lien statute 
upon which plaintiff relies—perhaps beyond the original intent. Even so, we must apply the statute as 
heretofore construed by this Court”). 
129. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1330. When either the prior data are 
deemed not to fit the new situation, such that the case is “unregulated” in Hart’s terms, HART, THE 
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C. A View From Practice  
The nonmoral view of law’s argumentative practice, just summarized, 
is rooted in law’s institutional nature and the constraints required by the 
logic of institutional structures. As in any field of study, complexities upon 
complexities will continue to engender refinements.130 Institutional logic, 
however, sets as a baseline the social practice by which the group 
constructs a functional assignment such that X counts as Y in context C.131 
The institutional fact that is created in this way rests on the collective 
recognition of the existence of the assignment. The X counts as Y in 
context C formula substantially comports with Hart’s understanding of the 
social practice of courts, officials, and private persons in their “use of 
unstated rules of recognition . . . in identifying particular rules of the 
system [that is] characteristic of the internal point of view.”132 
Nor, broken down to its elementary level, is the X counts as Y in 
context C figure formulated solely for some particularized subset of 
institutions in which deontic commitments are determined by shared 
understandings; rather, the logic underlies all institutional reality. This 
does not mean that there is, in fact, a shared understanding about law’s 
content, or the validity of legal propositions. Quite the opposite accounts 
for the widespread theoretical disagreement characterizing law’s 
argumentative structure. 
Nevertheless, the argumentative structure by which the institution 
resolves the content and validity of its rules focuses on the social fact of 
the recognition or acknowledgment, and resides in disagreement about that 
social fact.133 In other words, the new controversy arises over the manner 
and extent to which the prior institutional representations may apply now. 
Disputes about the standards for determining collective intentionality and 
the exactness of directives are disputes over what would render the newly 
competing legal claims true or false.134 The centrality of institutionalized 
 
 
CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 272, or when the relevant community’s morality has significantly 
shifted, judges in their discretion may take extralegal considerations, including the revised moral 
sensibilities, into account. 
130. See generally INSTITUTIONS, EMOTIONS, AND GROUP AGENTS (Anita K. Ziv & Hans B. 
Schmid, eds., 2014) (twenty-two essays regarding various aspects of, and arguments about, social 
ontology). 
131. See supra note 107–09, and accompanying text. 
132. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 102. 
133. See Savas L. Tsohatzidis, Searle’s Derivation of Promissory Obligation, in INTENTIONAL 
ACTS AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTS: ESSAYS ON JOHN SEARLE’S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 203, 204–05 (Savas 
L. Tsohatzidis, ed., 2010) (but ultimately attempting to set forth counterexamples to Searle’s thesis 
concerning institutional obligations). 
134. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 4. 
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argumentative structures is a principal characteristic that differentiates 
legal systems from other sorts of institutions.135 
Placing moral disagreement at the center, however, would essentially 
involve a category dilemma, giving primacy to argument over issues other 
than the standing of the competing claims within the institution’s 
practice.136 With regard to a case such as Riggs, for instance, we might be 
led down a conceptual mise-en-abîme were we to settle on an outcome 
derived from a reasoned inference of the legal community’s collective 
intention, yet still deem the case unresolved and then become embroiled in 
a larger moral controversy over whether that determination ought itself to 
be determinative. The institution’s practice is to settle on an intentionality 
standard for finally determining Elmer’s entitlement, and the Riggs court 
determined that the applicable standard intertwined the statutory language 
with the principle that a beneficiary not profit from his own wrongdoing. 
The court’s engaging in a further exercise aimed at justifying its decision 
procedure would sabotage law’s interest in finally resolving disputes, and 
be alien to law’s practice. 
Indeed, if the legal system is an institutional entity, and if X counts as 
Y in context C creates institutional facts, then proceeding to a moral 
controversy once we are able sufficiently to settle on the status of the 
parties in the litigated context would threaten an infinite regress requiring 
that each justification of the institutional belief about those statuses be 
justified in turn.137 Rather, legal dispute ends with a resolution of the 
theoretical disagreement over the standard for reckoning the social 
practice by which the legal community collectively recognizes the 
 
 
135. Along these lines, James Boyd White has suggested that law may be distinguished from 
other institutions by virtue of “its central moment, the legal hearing,” at which one version of its 
language is tested against another. James Boyd White, Thinking About Our Language, 96 YALE L. J. 
1960, 1963 (1987). Greenberg notes Joseph Raz’s view that legal systems distinguish themselves “by 
their claiming authority to regulate any type of behavior and by their claiming to be supreme.” 
Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1324–25 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 150–54 
(1975)). He further references Shapiro’s understanding that legal systems are unique because they are 
self-certifying, and hence need not establish the validity of their rules in a higher forum. Greenberg, 
supra note 1, at 1325 (citing SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 222 (2011)). 
136. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW 534 (2017) (saying, with regard 
to the application of Searle’s scheme to the concept of law, “[t]his perspective on social institutions 
facilitates a more nuanced view of what differentiates law from other social institutions, and helps 
expose multiple forms of law”). 
137.   Cf. Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1107 (1982) (explaining that 
“‘[w]hy’ questions have as much potential for infinite regress when pursued about factual beliefs as 
about moral beliefs. For example, while one may justify the belief that the tides will come in today as 
they did yesterday by referring to the moon’s gravitational force, one must justify the belief that the 
moon has gravitational force. And if one has an explanation of gravitational force in terms of a yet 
more general set of laws, one must then justify the belief that those laws are true”). 
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institutional status-function assignment. 
This is not to say that any status-function assignment within legal or 
other institutions might not have been motivated by extralegal moral 
considerations, and if so the moral factor would have been incorporated 
into law’s institutional norms. But resolving the institutional conflict now 
rests on social practice. Illustrating such a social practice, first in a simple, 
fairly nonmoral setting, consider a paper that counts as a dollar bill; once 
the bill is ripped, we ask what the social practice is, and whether the 
fragment, as a matter of custom or more formal prescription, counts as a 
dollar in that context.138 A bit more complex, pulling in the direction of 
moral assessment, when we ask whether the able-bodied adult has been 
assigned the status of a rescuer in the context of a stranger in peril, we 
typically query whether legal officials have collectively recognized that 
individual’s legal obligation to rescue under the circumstances.  The point 
is that this, too, is a nonmoral inquiry into social practice.139 These 
examples should help show that, although the term “status-function 
assignment” is superficially foreign to legal practice, its application is an 
apt description of the practice. 
The question, then, is whether this nonmoral view better comports 
with the reality of legal practice than does Greenberg’s Moral Impact 
Theory. For Greenberg, it is important that his theory derive from “the 
way in which lawyers, judges, and law practitioners work out what the law 
is,” because “the actual practice of skilled practitioners is good evidence of 
the relation between legal texts and the content of the law.”140 Nor need 
we be concerned with the way practitioners “theorize” their own practice, 
dismissed by Greenberg as being “notoriously bad.”141 
 
 
138.   See generally Quinley v. Lehigh Valley Traction Co., 15 Pa. D. 977, 977 (1905) (wherein 
“[t]he conductor again stated that he would not take the torn note, and added, ‘If you have no other 
money you must get off’”). As an aside, it has been generally accepted that custom counts as law in 
various circumstances. According to Jeremy Bentham, writing in the eighteenth century, for example, 
such custom gives rise to legitimate expectations, but it is the legal official’s imprimatur that solidifies 
custom as societally binding. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM 
OF WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 183, 238 (James H. Burns & 
Herbert L. A. Hart eds., 1977) (1928). Yet to the extent that custom does count as law, such law does 
not appear to be a “moral impact,” but rather to take the form of social practice that may be 
perpetuated and enforced linguistically. It is unclear how Greenberg would account for this 
phenomenon, however. 
139.   See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 831 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984) (noting “[t]he common law’s extreme reluctance to impose on an ‘innocent’ bystander a duty to 
rescue someone in peril even if the rescue would involve little or no risk to the rescuer is not only well 
known but it is notorious”). 
140. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 72. 
141. Id. Greenberg is likely rightly concerned here that few, if any, practitioners would 
characterize their legal dispute as a disagreement over the moral impacts of prior rulings.  
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It should be useful to venture a bit further into the case law. If moral 
analysis inheres in law’s argumentative structure – either by virtue of the 
search for moral impacts per Greenberg, or morally justifying principles 
per Dworkin – we would expect this dynamic to show up most readily in 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.142 Because precedents 
were few and hence the linguistic landscape minimal, and because “natural 
principles of justice” were then believed to be the source of the common 
law,143 the earliest constitutional opinions should provide fertile ground for 
moral impact’s reasoning. 
In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,144 for example, the Supreme Court 
addressed the rebellious conclusion of Virginia’s Supreme Court of 
Appeals “that the appellate power of the supreme court of the United 
States does not extend to this court, under a sound construction of the 
constitution of the United States.”145 The controversy went to the heart of 
the new American constitutional morality. At stake was the conflict 
between Virginia’s law authorizing the commonwealth to confiscate (pro-
British) Loyalists’ property and the later-executed 1794 Treaty of Peace 
with Britain,146 precluding such confiscations.147 Thomas Lord Fairfax, 
who owned five million acres known as the “Northern Neck of 
Virginia,”148 passed the property along to his relative Martin, but Virginia 
to Hunter, more or less.149 
One would expect the Supreme Court’s resolution of a conflict 
between state and federal government arising under the new Constitution 
to brim with moral rationale. And Martin does not disappoint. Yet Justice 
Joseph Story’s analysis in Martin is linguistically rigorous, and seems to 
follow a logical structure in which moral justifications are sandwiched 
between arguments rooted in what we might now characterize as the 
intentionality and exactness institutional constraints. 
Justice Story examined the interplay of the Constitution, the Jay 
Treaty, relevant statutes or other federal pronouncements, and local 
 
 
142. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) (favoring a “moral reading” of constitutional provisions that are written in 
moral language such that moral principles are incorporated into constitutional law). 
143. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 7 (1977). 
144. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
145. Id. at 323. 
146. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty and the 
United States of America, by Their President, with the Advice and Consent of Their Senate Gr. Brit.-
U.S., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. 
147. See Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 627 (1812). 
148. Martin, 14 U.S. at 307. 
149. Id. at 306. 
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statutory and contractual actions. And, indeed, the Martin opinion 
continues that a critical constitutional impact was “to invest the general 
government with all the powers which they might deem proper and 
necessary,” including the power to prohibit the states from exercising 
powers in conflict with federal authority.150 Yet Justice Story now 
immediately turns to a denial that “[t]hese deductions” rest on “general” 
moral reasoning.151 Rather, he emphasizes the text of the Tenth 
Amendment, “the import of its terms,” and the principle of construction 
that “[t]he words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not 
in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged.”152 The analysis purports to 
be anchored in linguistic content, however “general” the language may be. 
Determining that, unless the Supreme Court could exercise appellate 
jurisdiction over state court cases, “the appellate jurisdiction of the 
supreme Court would have nothing to act upon,”153 Justice Story argues 
from the linguistic impacts of moral forces, rather than the moral impacts 
of linguistic pronouncements. The framers intended the Constitution “to 
endure through a long lapse of ages,” and this served in the analysis to 
explain the use of general language, “leaving to the legislature, from time 
to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects . . . .”154 
The Martin Court then lays a linguistic foundation for its resolution of the 
controversy, engaging in a lengthy disquisition about the language in 
Article III, “which must principally attract our attention.”155 
There can, of course, be no direct or definitive proof in favor of a 
moral versus nonmoral view of law’s content. Any legal institutional 
writing, whether statutory or judicial, can be construed to say what the law 
is, as of that moment and in the context of the factual and legal 
circumstances being addressed, or to engender moral impacts in the legal 
system which rather constitute law’s content. The textual language 
directing the court clerk to engage in the ministerial act of “entering” a 
judgment on the docket, to embody the final institutional resolution of the 
matter, can be construed holistically as creating a moral obligation that 
maintains the system’s overall coordination and organization of citizens’ 
rights and duties. 
Yet Greenberg rightly acquiesces in approaching the theory of law’s 
content as tightly connected to an understanding of law’s argumentative 
 
 
150. Id. at 324–25. 
151. Id. at 325. 
152. Id. at 325–26 (discussing U.S. CONST., amend. X). 
153. Id. at 340. 
154. Id. at 326–27. 
155. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 327 (1816). 
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structure. If the latter is, arguably, primarily nonmoral, then this should 
qualify the theoretical soundness of a substantive view from morality. 
Greenberg does not overthrow the intuition that, in most cases, what is 
being argued over reveals what the argument is actually about. 
Conceptualizing law as morally desirable, or as typically aimed at 
fostering a morally improved social order, is consistent with a view of 
law’s content and validity as separate from morality.156 
In Martin, Justice Story implicitly asks whether the Constitution’s 
language is directed at the controversy arising from the Virginia court’s 
defiance. His interpretation of the text is necessarily interventionist, 
because the language does not precisely address the controversy. Justice 
Story might have tried to resolve the case by asking what outcome the 
relevant moral values, on balance, support.157 He certainly justified his 
analysis by summoning, in favor of Supreme Court review, avoidance of 
the “public mischiefs” that would attend the lack of “uniformity of 
decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the 
purview of the constitution.”158 
Yet there is a difference between the moral impetus for legal 
institutional action and the moral impacts of that action. Also 
distinguishable are moral justifications in favor of a certain interpretation 
of the legal text and moral impacts resulting from that textual language. 
Justice Story went to great lengths, at the outset of the Martin opinion, to 
hold out “[t]he great respectability” of the Virginia court, its laudable 
“learning and ability.”159 However much rhetorical balm, the Court’s 
message—and the pragmatic message consistently coursing through 
appellate review generally—is that the prior court may have erred legally, 
but not morally. It would be a leap not yet justified to relegate this implicit 
underlying assumption to systemic conceptual confusion.   
More interestingly, appellate courts have a vested institutional interest 
in not being, and in not being perceived as, the moral overseers of the 
lower courts. The judges at both levels are cut from the same fabric, 
having had commensurable training, and having taken the same 
constitutional oaths, and are ostensibly devoted to quite similar societal 
and constitutional values, such as due process, equal opportunity, fair play, 
the rule of law, and so on. Overtly moral, rather than legal, conceptual and 
interpretive review of lower court decisions and legislative actions could 
 
 
156.    SHAPIRO, supra note 135, at 404–05, n.8. 
157.   Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1331. 
158.   14 U.S. at 347–48. 
159.   Id. at 324. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
324      WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 11:2 
 
 
 
 
well destabilize the efficient jurisdictional interplay between the judicial 
levels and branches of government.160 
III. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE MORAL IMPACT THEORY 
A. The Two-Level Problem 
From time to time an empiricist’s conundrum is widely disseminated 
online, leaving people scratching their heads and wondering how precisely 
the same stimuli can generate incompatible impressions.161 Something 
similar occurs here, to the extent that Greenberg discerns in actual legal 
practice an argumentative structure by which conflicts between moral 
considerations are resolved, while others discern disputes over social facts 
or nonmoral standards of fit. This disconnect is, in turn, relevant to the 
philosophical debate over the ontology of law. 
Disagreeing with the Moral Impact Theory’s premise, we must try to 
explain where Greenberg goes wrong. The moral philosopher Richard 
Hare has offered an astute critique of moral thinking gone awry that 
should be helpful. Hare’s thesis was that a great deal of confusion had 
vexed both theoretical ethics and practical moral thinking as a result of 
neglect of the distinction between the two levels at which moral thought 
occurs.162 
The two-level system begins with the general, prima facie principles 
that we intuitively summon when confronted by some morally challenging 
circumstance. Relatively simple moral principles are necessary but not 
sufficient for solving many moral problems that arise in new or more 
complex situations.163 For one thing, the new situation will often require 
some sort of conciliation, a weighing and balancing of conflicting prima 
facie principles. Commitment to keeping one’s promises, for example, 
sometimes gives way to later-arising and morally weighty demands to 
attend to someone else in need. 
The non-intuitive kind of moral thinking, at which conflicts and 
difficult scenarios are resolved upon deliberation, happens at the level of 
critical thinking. Being moral, both levels of thought give rise, in Hare’s 
 
 
160.   See generally Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 823 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“Judicial 
reluctance if not refusal to adjudicate or even advise Congress on merely moral claims is old in our 
jurisprudence.”). 
161.   Maya Salam & Daniel Victor, Yanny or Laurel? How a Sound Clip Divided America, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/15/science/yanny-laurel.html. 
162.   HARE, supra note 16, at 25. In this discussion, we bracket the third, metaethical level. 
163.   Id. at 39. 
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system, to universal prescriptions. However, thinking at the critical level 
can involve a high level of specificity, and so principles generated in 
critical thinking can be of “unlimited specificity.”164 Critical moral 
thinking not only adjudicates between competing general principles by, for 
example, picking out which differences between those principles and the 
new ones are relevant to the moral choice, but also selects our prima facie 
principles in the first instance.165 
Intuitive thinking is meant to approximate what we would choose, as 
morally best, were we capable of perfect critical thinking at each 
moment.166 Being ordinary human beings, however, we aren’t perfect, and 
necessarily pull from our inventory of general intuitive principles first, and 
then, if the situation permits and requires this, reason our way to an all-
things-considered solution at the second level of critical moral thinking.167 
The two-level analysis might itself seem fairly intuitive. But in this 
regard Hare is addressing an intricate dilemma and, by his clear 
headedness, making it look easy. For Hare, neglect of the distinction 
between the two levels of moral thought had caused substantial 
confusion.168 Relevant here, a failure to disambiguate between the intuitive 
and critical levels of thinking appears to undergird the Moral Impact 
Theory as well. It is at the critical level that legal and moral thinking 
diverge. 
No one would seriously doubt that the actions of legal institutions 
have moral impacts. With regard to the nature of those impacts, Greenberg 
confines his analysis to legal officials, because (1) ordinary citizens “do 
not have a general moral obligation to do what the legislature or other 
legal institutions command,” and, in contrast, (2) “the legal system can 
typically generate moral obligations of government officials . . .169 
Certainly, by accepting an official position, taking the oath, and exercising 
authority over the lives of others, a citizen’s moral status and obligations 
are affected. The official thereby assumes various moral obligations to 
fellow officials and to the public. The legal community has a right to 
expect the official to further the legal system’s institutional interests, and 
 
 
164.   Id. at 41. 
165.   Id. at 39, 49–50. 
166.   Id. at 46 (stating the Aristotelian view that, “[i]f we were archangels, we could by critical 
thinking alone decide what we ought to do on each occasion . . . .”) (emphasis in original). 
167.   Id. at 27. 
168.   Id. at 25; see also Richard M. Hare, Moral Conflicts, in I THE TANNER LECTURE ON 
HUMAN VALUES 169, 184 (Sterling M. McMurrin, ed., 1980) (emphasizing that “[m]any confusions 
arise through our failing to distinguish between these different levels of appraisal”). 
169.   Greenberg, Moral Imapct Theory, supra note 1, at 1318 (emphasis in original). 
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the public a genuine expectation that she will proceed in good faith on 
behalf of the community. 
Greenberg links law’s moral content to legal institutional practices by 
locating that content “downstream of the legal practices.”170 However, the 
one-system of law and morality found downstream agglomerates moral 
impacts. Why, in other words, wouldn’t an individual assuming an official 
position in’ the Cookie Factory or in nearly any discrete institution, find 
herself in a similar moral circumstance? Greenberg says little that would 
prevent us from applying his analysis, with equal force, in defense of a 
position holding that the content of the cookie-producing credo is that part 
of the moral profile created by the actions of cookie factories in the proper 
way.171 Although he ascribes to legal systems a variety of important 
societal functions,172 the distinctiveness he affords legal institutions really 
amounts to a matter of degree, as he appears to acknowledge.173 When the 
Cookie Factory takes on a new supplier, or a new supermarket chain as 
customer, or even when it moves Mary’s spot away from John’s at her 
request, these decisions and actions impact or alter the broader range of 
the factory officials’ moral obligations, powers, privileges, and so on, 
impacting their moral profile. 
The “genuine, all-things-considered, practical obligations” that may 
thereby be created by the Cookie Factory’s workings, however, do not in 
an abstract or general sense constitute the conceptual content of cookie 
production.174 And yet it might well be reasonable to say that the Cookie 
Factory, “by its nature, is supposed to change the moral system for the 
better.”175 Cookies, like most institutional products or outcomes, are 
“supposed” to make people’s lives better. This can no doubt be analyzed 
under various theories of morality. Cookie production should increase the 
general welfare by, inter alia, providing profits for the owners, jobs and 
wages for the employees, tasty treats for the public at a price trade-off that 
increases the consumer’s general utility, and so forth. 
To more distinctively tie the Moral Impact Theory to law, Greenberg 
now moves away from the notion that the Theory concerns pointedly a 
legal system’s moral impacts upon legal officials. He says, instead, that we 
treat law “not merely as one relevant consideration among many, but as a 
 
 
170.   Id. at 1301. 
171.   Id. at 1323. 
172.   Id. at 1339. 
173.   Id. at 1325 (conceding that “it is plausible that the features that distinguish a legal system 
(or institution) from other systems are a matter of degree”). 
174.    Id. at 1306. 
175.   Id. at 1322. 
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central concern,” because “the legal institutions change what we are 
obligated to do.”176 We, however, are ordinary citizens and subjects, the 
sorts of individuals that Greenberg has elsewhere correctly deemed not to 
have “a general moral obligation to do what the legislature or other legal 
institutions command.”177 
Law is ultimately not sharply-enough distinguished from other 
institutions under the Moral Impact Theory. Under the Theory, legal 
institutions change the facts and circumstances relevant to our moral 
obligations by, for example, altering people’s expectations, providing new 
options, or bestowing blessings on particular schemes.178 The Cookie 
Factory’s new profit-sharing plan might do likewise. The fact that, in the 
legal context, the blessings are bestowed by “the people’s 
representatives”179 rather than a board of directors does not by itself do the 
work of creating a discrete species of morally significant expectations, 
except by degree. 
Greenberg further points out that, at a practical level, actions by legal 
institutions can improve the moral situation by engendering an obligation 
shared by all community members.180 Whereas one volunteer may not 
make much of a difference, the community as a whole can make real 
progress. Wouldn’t this rationale, however, analogize to the Cookie 
Factory’s use of less sugar to promote health, or biodegradable packaging 
rather than petroleum-based plastic? These actions, too, would serve to 
relieve the individual of the task of altering her personal lifestyle to that 
extent, would impact all sales and purchases of the particular product, and 
more broadly could educate and thereby influence the consumer culture 
overall.181 
The difficulties here arise from the tension within Greenberg’s Moral 
Impact Theory between (1) the need to localize institutional moral impacts 
to the set of individuals for which these impacts create true obligations, 
namely legal officials, and (2) the need to broaden the impacts to the set of 
 
 
176.   Id. at 1304–05. 
177.   Id. at 1318. 
178.   Id. at 1290. 
179.   Id. Moreover, representatives in the political system may not even be truly representative 
of the people’s interests, and may be beholden to a far narrower grouping of interests, thus further 
blurring any posited distinction between them and the hypothetical board of directors. I thank Theanne 
Liu for this insight.  
180.   Id. at 1294. 
181.   See, e.g., Audrae Erickson, Agriculture: Farmers, Agrifood Industry, Scientists, and 
Consumers, 30 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 263, 263 (2004) (“Another new development produced by one of our 
member companies is biodegradable plastics from corn that will have an enormous and beneficial 
impact on the environment.”). 
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individuals for which institutional actions determine the content of the 
institution’s prescriptions as a special case, namely all of us. But the 
conceptually prior question, returning to Hare, concerns the sort of moral 
impacts that the theorist takes as law’s content, an issue that also 
implicates what might motivate the Theory. 
A first explanatory candidate draws on Hare’s two-level thesis. 
Reckoning the moral impacts of legal institutional actions is sensitive to 
competing and conflicting moral intuitions. Greenberg, of course, 
recognizes both that moral issues generate controversy and that statutory 
and appellate decisions often fail to resolve such controversy.182 He 
responds, though, that law has important functions other than settling 
disagreements, such as checking government coercion and improving our 
moral situation.183 At any rate, says Greenberg, the Moral Impact Theory 
acknowledges law’s characteristic way of settling disputes, namely, “by 
having a mechanism for generating specific orders (directed at particular 
individuals) that are backed up with force.”184 He continues that “there are 
powerful moral reasons to give binding force to such specific orders of a 
government that has de facto authority.”185 
Greenberg’s cursory response to the dilemma posed by a theory of law 
that identifies law’s content with morals, namely, the inevitable generation 
of moral disagreement, is quite interesting in the light of Hare’s own 
thinking about this matter. For Hare, the mechanism or procedure used in 
the legal system for resolving controversies is precisely the apparatus that 
separates law from morality.186 If we ask what courts or legislators ought 
to do, then we can use moral reasoning, and hence Hare’s two-level 
approach, to arrive at an answer.187 When, however, law and morality are 
“not distinguished so carefully as for clarity they should be,” as in natural 
law thinking, then the result is “to throw us back on our own intuitions (in 
effect, our moral intuitions), . . . without recourse to the critical thinking 
that would help us settle our differences.”188 
As next shown, it does appear that, in a significant way, Greenberg 
sticks to the intuitive level of moral thinking in his view of how law 
 
 
182.   Greenberg, Moral Impact, supra note 1, at 1339. 
183.   Id. 
184.   Id. at 1339–40. 
185.   Id. at 1340. 
186.   HARE, supra note 16, at 151. 
187.   Id. 
188.   Id. None of this is to claim that the Moral Impact Theory is a version of natural law moral 
theory. Greenberg asserts as “uncontroversial” that “at least many facts” about law’s content are not 
among the universe’s ultimate facts. Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1295. 
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resolves controversy. The state intervenes with a decision backed by force, 
one intuition prevailing over another. That Hare may have understood law 
to resolve conflict along these lines as well would not have been 
problematic for him, because he did not equate law with morality, and saw 
them as involving “quite different procedure[s].”189 
Nor was Hare much concerned about law’s argumentative structure. 
He was a moral philosopher, and to the extent that he addressed legal 
rights and obligations, law was a foil for, not a focus of, his moral 
philosophizing. Greenberg, however, is fully concerned with the ways in 
which a legal system’s decision-making apparatus provides the “basic 
facts that determine the content of the law.”190 Commitment to identifying 
those basic facts as moral ones risks the sort of confusion Hare critiqued. 
Moral intuitions might naturally be experientially prior for the judges 
when they receive the case. Resolving the case, however, turns them 
toward the sort of critical legal deliberation Greenberg deemed to fall short 
of explanatory moral analysis in Smith.191 
On the other hand, it is also conceivable, perhaps even likely, that 
courts receive most cases in an institutionally prudential frame of mind, 
with moral intuitions somewhat secondary. In that event, their initial 
intuitions may concern the capabilities and interests of the legal system 
qua institution, including what approach the court should take to best 
preserve its legitimacy, to minimize problems and enhance efficiencies by 
providing fairly clear guidance for future decision-making, to generate the 
least societal pushback, and so forth. As an empirical matter, moral 
considerations are likely present in these intuitions in varying degrees. 
And elevating institutional survival over the suffering of affected 
individuals might be morally justified in certain cases.192 
Beyond the quick intuitive level, however, legal decision-making 
grapples with the issues at the ponderous critical level. But it is at this 
level that legal thinking, and law’s argumentative structure, takes on 
distinct features, different from those that characterize critical moral 
thinking. Greenberg marshals at length the Smith court’s majority and 
 
 
189.   HARE, supra note 16, at 151. 
190.   Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1295. 
191.   Id. at 1328–30. 
         192.   This dynamic sometimes plays out, for example, in toxic tort and other litigations when the 
court expresses sympathy for the foreseeable harm sustained by the plaintiff but nevertheless holds 
that deeming the particular defendant to have a legal duty to the injured party might be unfair in the 
final analysis and potentially impair the judicial system by engendering “limitless liability.” See 
generally Hamilton v. Baretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001) (explaining that 
“judicial resistance to the expansion of duty grows out of practical concerns both about potentially 
limitless liability and about the unfairness of imposing liability for the acts of another”). 
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dissenting opinions’ “diverse considerations in support of their opposing 
positions,” including such issues as how words are ordinarily used, how 
Congress intended the language to be construed, whether Congress would 
have wished its language to cover the situation, and whether Congress 
intended the type of transaction, involving a particularized “use” of a 
firearm, to warrant a heightened penalty.193 
The unresolved question is whether the considerations marshaled by 
Greenberg exemplify critical moral thinking, or more likely nonmoral 
controversies over the standards for determining whether the existing legal 
materials are sufficiently directed at the present circumstances, and/or 
whether they provide a solution to the new matter with sufficient 
exactness. The issues in Smith, as cited by Greenberg himself, concern 
linguistic and intentionality concerns. This article’s thesis is that legal 
argument differs from critical moral thinking, and that law’s 
argumentative structure, at the critical level, reflects principally nonmoral 
theoretical disagreement over the relevance and applicability of prior 
institutional actions. The impulse to hold otherwise, we surmise, may 
derive from an impression created by the competing moral intuitions that 
often arise at the outset, when legal officials encounter the new case or 
situation. 
In a more recent writing, Greenberg reaffirms that, under his Moral 
Impact Theory, the content of law consists of obligations, rights, powers, 
and so forth.193 He suggests that a theorist might begin with a set of “some 
prima facie attractive positions on legal interpretation,” and then “use a 
method analogous to reflective equilibrium” to advance the theory.194 At 
the same time, says Greenberg, legal interpretation should ascertain “the 
all-things-considered normative consequences” of the contemplated legal 
institutional action, and in doing so, need not necessarily involve direct 
moral or normative reasoning.”195 
There is much to unpack there. Very briefly, however, use of the 
“method analogous to reflective equilibrium” will not necessarily place the 
interpreter at the level of critical moral thinking. The reflective 
equilibrium method originating with John Rawls is more closely identified 
with an adjustment of prima facie principles in the service of an overall 
coherence scheme.196 While Greenberg does see law, albeit with some 
 
 
193.   Mark Greenberg, Response: What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? 
Legal Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 105, 109 (2017). 
194.   Id. at 111 n.18. 
195.   Id. at 117–18. 
196.   NORMAN DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 21–22 (1996) (attempting to distinguish “wide reflective equilibrium” from 
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equivocation, as the “all-things-considered” outcome of institutional 
action, and although he allows that context may provide a determinant of 
legal content,197 he does not well enough account for the likelihood that 
the moral impacts of one institutional action will conflict with those of 
another. It would be strange to have certain obligations constitute law’s 
content in one scenario, yet simultaneously not be law’s content in 
another. 
This is why, for Hare, obligations and rights were most likely 
“concepts belonging to intuitive thinking and governed by prima facie 
principles.”198 By contrast, a distinguishing feature of moral principles 
belonging to critical thinking was their quality of being overriding and not 
capable of being overridden.199 This does not describe rights or 
obligations, the stuff of Greenberg’s content of law. Says Hare, “[w]e 
have, then, as elsewhere, a two-level structure of moral thinking, with 
claims about rights confined to the intuitive level.”200 
Yet legal argument addressing controversy involves critical thinking. 
It is just that this critical thinking occurring within law’s argumentative 
structure is specialized, and rarely expressed in moral terms, by virtue of 
appeals to moral sentiments, or to the need for universalizable remedial 
principles, and the like. Indeed, in contrast to the universal prescriptions of 
unlimited specificity derived from critical moral thinking, at least in 
Hare’s model,201 legal outcomes are presumed not universally prescriptive, 
but rather locally binding. However highly coveted are inter-jurisdictional 
consistency and uniformity.202 
 
 
subjectivism or intuitionism, as may characterize the simple attempt to “fit” intuitions under “narrow” 
equilibrium, but nevertheless explaining that the wide method remains “coherentist”); JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 18–22, 46–53 (1971); see also Joel Feinberg, Rawls and Intuitionism, in READING 
RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS’ “A THEORY OF JUSTICE” 108, 108 (Normal Daniels ed., 1989) 
(1975) (hereinafter “READING RAWLS”) (contending that Rawls’ theory “is itself clearly intuitionistic, 
for it provides no method for weighing distinct principles of justice”). 
197.   Greenberg, Principles, supra note 86, at 47. 
198.   HARE, supra note 16, at 153. 
199.   Id. at 61, 153. 
200.   Id. at 153–54. 
201.   See id. at 41. 
202.   See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 1971) 
(reciting that “[a] court applies the law of its own state, as it understands it, including its own 
conception of Conflict of Laws. It derives this law from the same sources which are used for 
determining all its law: from constitutions, treaties and statutes, from precedent, from considerations of 
ethical and social need and of public policy in general, from analogy, and from other forms of legal 
reasoning”). Again, Greenberg does not purport to adopt a traditional natural law theory (see supra 
note 188), which took at its core “an ideal of a universal super-law discoverable by reason, to which 
local law ought to conform and of which local law is at best a reflection.” Roscoe Pound, A 
Comparison of Ideals of Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1933). 
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B. The Open Question Problem 
We next consider a further philosophical difficulty. Participants in 
legal practice, as well as in the general community, hold the widespread 
belief that some rule R might both be the law, but not be (morally) right. 
In the common understanding, it is often an open question whether it is a 
good thing that we fulfill the legal obligation with which R saddles us, 
without doubting that R is the law.203 
We can conceive of numerous situations, both speculatively and in 
reality, through which we clearly want to say that our all-things-
considered moral obligation conflicts with our legal obligation, as when 
we may be compelled to engage in civil disobedience to protest unjust 
legal measures.204 The general understanding that defective law is yet the 
law leads theorists such as Andrei Marmor to say, with Greenberg’s model 
in mind, that common sense “has never stood in the way of philosophical 
arguments.”205 The Moral Impact Theory is an eliminativist work in 
progress that will have to better address this open question argument. 
Greenberg does not deny that there are evil “laws,” in the form of texts 
issued by the legal institution.206 But he does deny that such laws can 
comprise law’s content.207 
Applying the challenge to law’s argumentative structure, the point is 
that it remains an open issue whether argument about the moral impacts of 
legal institutional action is argument about law’s content. The moral 
impact of a prior legal decision or enactment may sometimes be expressly 
considered by a court when assessing the gravity of an error,208 but 
otherwise courts typically take the view that “[w]hether a moral obligation  
 
 
203.   GEORGE E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 1–37 (1903). Moore’s “open question” argument 
fell out of favor as a technique for demonstrating the “fallacy” of inferring moral conclusions from 
natural or factual premises. See Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424, 
2428–29 (1992). However, reductive or eliminativist theories must usually overcome some sort of 
open question argument. See Matthew Silverstein, Reducing Reasons, 10 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 2 
(2016). 
204.   Steven Schaus, How to Think About Law as Morality: A Comment on Greenberg and 
Hershovitz, 124 YALE L. J. FORUM 224, 231–32 (2015). 
205.   MARMOR, supra note 122, at 11. 
206.   Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1338. Nor has Greenberg addressed 
whether law motivates actions in a way that deviates from morality’s inherent motivating feature, 
although it is certainly significant that legal institutional pronouncements do so. 
207.   Id. at 1322. 
208.   Greenwood v. State, No. 1603, 2016 WL 6680471, at *4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., Nov. 14, 
2016). 
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exists in a particular situation is primarily a question of policy and ethics 
rather than one of law . . . .”209 
There is much to be said for Greenberg’s notion that practitioners are 
not especially competent to theorize their own practice.210 That is simply 
not part of their training. But neither is gauging moral impacts. Moreover, 
moral theorizing about the common understanding is itself an intuitive, not 
critical, exercise.211 The Moral Impact Theory, however, arises from 
Greenberg’s presumption that practitioners’ actual practice provides “good 
evidence of the relation between legal texts and the content of the law.”212 
We accept this presumption as well-formed. 
As with linguistic rather than moral intuitions, legal practitioners’ 
utterances provide theoretical data concerning the sort of argument in 
which they themselves are engaging. There does not seem to be a 
theoretical impediment to concluding that legal officials’ linguistic 
participation in law’s argumentative structure clarifies the logic of their 
practice and the meaning of their speech acts. Anthropological or 
historical studies of by-gone legal entitlements or requirements, for 
example, look to legal texts and court records, and accept official 
explanations as evidence of what happened.213 Greenberg might dismiss 
these projects as adhering to the Standard Picture. Yet excavating for 
law’s content in historical or anthropological contexts under the 
assumption that such content “will almost invariably diverge from the 
content of the authoritative pronouncements,”214 and hence that “the 
linguistic content of pronouncements (decisions, etc.) has no special 
status,”215 would be hebetudinous. 
Power relationships are ordinarily realized through the performance of 
speech acts and, for the institution—including a legal system—socially 
created by virtue of those speech acts to hold together and evolve, a level 
of public understanding as well as collective observation of those power 
 
 
 
209.   Koike v. Board of Water Supply, 352 P.2d 835, 840 (Hawaii 1960); Monroe v. Standard 
Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 562 (1981) (interpreting the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance 
Act of 1974, saying that “the language relied on by the petitioner hardly supports a finding that 
Congress intended § 2021(b)(3) to convert a generalized moral obligation into a specific legal duty”). 
210.  Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 72. 
211.  Richard M. Hare, Rawls’ Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS, supra note 196, at 81, 84. 
212.  Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 72. 
213.  See, e.g., Lena Salaymeh, Every Law Tells a Story: Orthodox Divorce in Jewish and 
Islamic Legal Histories, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 19, 54 (2014) (examining “the surviving historical 
evidence (primarily legal texts and some court records)” to assess a woman’s ability to divorce under 
ancient Mesopotamian law). 
214.   Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 6, at 102. 
215.  Id. at 59. 
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relations and status function assignments are required.216 Regardless of 
how legal officials may theorize the relation between their 
pronouncements and legal content—if they do so at all—their stated 
beliefs about whether they themselves are deliberating morally likely 
count as significant data on that issue. 
C. Widespread Consideration of Persuasive Authority 
In legal practice, the parties tender what Stephen Toulmin called “the 
exigencies of practical affairs [that] have provided the material for 
subsequent theoretical analysis.”217 When the legal case begins, the first 
step for the litigants or the court is to discern whether the existing legal 
materials—prior decisions, enactments, and so forth—point the way 
ahead. If the answer is clearly “yes,” law is likely, but not strictly 
compelled, to accept that outcome and resolve the matter. If not, because 
the new situation is rarely quite like the old, and because natural language 
is necessarily open-textured, the litigants as well as the court will often 
summon some manner of persuasive authority.218 But either way, the 
controversy that defines the case will at the outset be characterized by a 
claim that one outcome or the other is supported by existing institutional 
norms that are directed at the new situation.219 
Now for the Moral Impact Theory, what is morally required is not a 
matter of what the legal texts say on their face or even what they mean in 
pragmatic contextual terms.220 It may matter, as one consideration out of 
many, whether the prior institutional communicative acts frame the 
present controversy. But the prior and existing linguistic data is neither the 
law nor directly explanatory of what the law requires. Under the Theory, 
the sort of disagreement coursing through law’s argumentative structure is 
not about the intentionality and exactness of the data, but rather the moral 
implications of prior institutional actions. 
So, in Greenberg’s project, the court now decides what are the moral 
impacts of prior relevant judicial or legislative actions, and those impacts, 
but not the texts or codifications, are the law to this point. When the 
 
 
216.  SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD, supra note 101, at 151; SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION 
OF SOCIAL REALITY, supra note 107, at 124. 
217.   STEPHEN TOULMIN, 1 HUMAN UNDERSTANDING: THE COLLECTIVE USE AND EVOLUTION 
OF CONCEPTS 86-87 (1972). 
218.   Reid v. Life Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 1983) (noting that, “[i]n deciding a 
question of first impression, the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions are persuasive authority”). 
219.   See Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial 
Responsibility, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 771, 774–75 (1999). 
220.   Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1303. 
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analysis concludes, and judgment is entered, the law of the case is neither 
the rule announced in linguistic terms in the decision nor the speech act 
embodied in the decree entered in favor of one party and against the other. 
Rather, the law of the case is, indirectly, the moral impact of the rule as 
announced and the judgment as entered. 
While it would seem that the legal pronouncement should effectuate 
an end to critical deliberation,221 it may turn out that, under the Moral 
Impact Theory, the unremitting need to gauge moral impacts in flux 
threatens to upend any practicable sense of law’s clarity and finality.222 
Partly to avoid such “routes to disaster,”223 the moral legal philosopher 
Lon Fuller famously articulated certain criteria that any legal system must 
aspire towards, but that presuppose the critical importance of the linguistic 
content of legal communicative acts. These criteria include, for instance, 
(1) the adoption of general rules that permit the system to avoid merely ad 
hoc decision-making; (2) the publication of those rules such that 
participants may be capable of knowing what is expected of them; and (3) 
the articulation of the rules such as they may be understandable.224 
Whether subscribing to the Moral Impact Theory or a nonmoral view 
of law’s argumentative structure, the point will remain that the new 
situation is indeed new, and may or may not be “covered by” prior 
outcomes. If our naturally first inclination when confronting a new 
situation is to think back to and take authority from a prior, similar 
circumstance, and to seek guidance from how we dealt with or resolved 
that matter, then we can make the claim that asking whether the prior 
resolution covers the present case accords with the natural or inevitable 
way of approaching these questions. Constraints of exactness and 
intentionality allow our backward-looking inquiry to be satisfactory, and 
in legal analysis point in the direction of arguably relevant precedent, if 
any. Institutional logic and “the whole distinctive style of human thought” 
press legal officials and litigants to pass through these analytic portals in 
their practical approach to controversies.225 
Greenberg’s theory may derive, in part, from the tension created by 
the unmooring of law’s existing content from its present adjudicative 
exercise. Both the moral and nonmoral views should agree that this 
 
 
221.   See H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 253–
55 (1982) (discussing the “peremptory or deliberation-excluding and content-independent” nature of 
interpersonal normative and legal transactions). 
222.   See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
223.   LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (1964). 
224.   Id. 
225.   HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9, at 88. 
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detachment exists, because each matter arises in a new context rarely 
addressed with precision in prior “distinguishable” cases. Law’s 
argumentative structure juxtaposes the preexisting legal data as 
communicated on the particular prior occasion, and in the particular 
prior context, against the new situation, such that interpretation intervenes 
to reconceptualize those existing legal materials in the light of the new 
matter.226 
Toward this end, there appears to be a further disconnect between the 
Moral Impact Theory’s view of law’s content and the commonplace 
practice of relying on persuasive authority.. Such authority, by definition, 
has not engendered any moral obligation on the part of the forum official, 
and does not compel any particular decision-making exercise. Indeed, 
persuasive authority, like advisory opinions, is minimally a linguistic 
source capable of influencing intentional states, but without imposing 
obligations.227 
Because, in this scenario, extra-jurisdictional actions become the 
guiding authority for decision-making, the argumentative question cannot 
be what the moral impacts of prior institutional action are. For a moral 
impact theory, the question might be limited to what moral impacts do we 
now want to create. Receptiveness to extralegal inputs does not align with 
a moral impacts theory of law’s content, or with nonpositivist theory 
generally. Meanwhile, the constant incorporation of persuasive authority 
in our jurisprudence does presuppose the practice of examining standards 
of intentionality. This is because persuasive authority is all the less 
persuasive the more the binding data in the home jurisdiction is deemed to 
be directed at the new case, and vice versa. In this way, litigants and legal 
officials come to decide whether, and to what extent, persuasive authority 
may be appropriate or useful. 
  
 
 
226.  See Marmor, supra note 108, at 17 (stating that “when judges and other officials interpret 
the law or apply it in novel ways, their engagement with the relevant norm is what makes it the law”); 
cf. DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH & INTERPRETATION 141 (1984) (explaining that “[w]e 
interpret a bit of linguistic behaviour when we say what a speaker’s words mean on an occasion of 
use”). 
227.  See Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638, 646 (6th Cir. 2015) (saying, “[g]iven the factual 
similarities between the two cases, we would arguably be obliged to grant Thompson’s petition if 
Velasquez were a binding precedent in this circuit. But the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Velasquez is in 
fact persuasive authority only”); In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (N.C. 1985) (explaining 
that “[a]dvisory opinions of the justices as individuals may be persuasive authority for the points of 
law addressed, but they are in no sense binding or obligatory on those points”). 
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To be fair, Greenberg’s writing does account for some relevance of 
persuasive authority, or “foreign law,”228 but only ex post and in terms of 
what effect that material may have “on the Constitution’s impact on the 
moral profile.”229 Yet courts consider persuasive authority daily even apart 
from any discernible prior impact upon the local jurisprudence, and likely 
without a sense of compunction regarding the moral effect here of those 
extra-jurisdictional pronouncements. Nor is it fully clear what Greenberg 
means when he mentions “the relevance of foreign law,” for under his 
Theory this can only refer to the moral impacts of foreign legal 
institutional action, suggesting the need for quite an obscure causal 
analysis. 
IV. LAW’S MORAL IMPACT UPON OFFICIALS AND THE COMMUNITY 
This article has suggested a number of problems with the idea that 
law’s content consists in the moral impacts of the relevant actions of legal 
institutions. At the same time, there is no question that legal institutional 
actions have moral impacts, and generate moral obligations. If we are not 
convinced that those impacts constitute the content of the law, then what 
can we say about their role and nature? 
Legal institutional actions have moral impacts upon both legal 
officials and ordinary citizens. Legal officials assume obligations when 
they take an oath of office or make some similarly solemn commitment to 
follow and apply the law, particularly the Constitution, to the best of their 
ability. But it would beg the question to say that legal officials actually 
have a moral obligation to follow or apply the law. It is a different matter 
whether individuals who become legal officials have a moral obligation to 
act in ways that are conducive to justifying the legal system’s authority, 
thereby promoting its legitimacy.230 Legal officials, in other words, may 
arguably be obligated to implement their official roles in ways that 
improve the moral standing of the laws.231 
  
 
 
228.  Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1332. 
229.  Id. 
230.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 7 (2d ed. 
2009) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW]. 
231.  Cf. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1294. 
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Greenberg has not established that legal officials are morally obligated 
to arrive at a particular substantive outcome in any case or controversy. 
Rather, officials ordinarily commit themselves to treating litigants and 
other citizens in a certain manner, and deciding cases and controversies 
impartially and in accord with accepted norms and prescribed 
procedures.232 
Yet if the moral impacts are themselves law’s content, as Greenberg 
says, then the judicial normative exercise,233 the practice by which 
decision-making creates norms,234 reduces to a project of reckoning what 
those impacts are, and hence how the court is now obligated to act.235 That 
judges lack any significant discretion has been an anti-positivist precept.236 
Greenberg does not really address the notion of discretion in his work on 
the Moral Impact Theory. Yet, as Raz opined early on, “[t]he thesis of 
judicial discretion does not entail that in cases where discretion may be 
exercised anything goes. Such cases are governed by laws which rule out 
certain decisions. The only claim is that the laws do not determine any 
decision as the correct one.”237 
We suggest, however, that the most fertile ground for examining the 
moral impacts of legal institutional action is with the community itself. 
 
 
232.   See generally David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 565 (2001) (noting one jurist’s view that “judges have a moral obligation 
to treat parties as persons instead of masked symbols of legal abstractions”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 2310 (2017) (opining about “why judges may 
indeed have legal as well as moral obligations of judicial candor and about the ways in which legal 
obligations may generate moral obligations”); Carl A. Auerbach, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: 
A Critique of Eisenberg’s The Nature of the Common Law 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 556 (1991) (“This 
moral obligation arises from the judicial commitment to carry out the rules of the office.”) (omitting 
citation). 
233.   See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons From 
Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1684 n.58 (2003); Susan Bandes, The Idea of A Case, 42 STANFORD L. 
REV. 227, 299 (1990) (explaining that, “in a number of contexts, the Court has recognized its norm 
creation function as more important than its dispute resolution function”). 
234.   As Kenneth Himma has stated, “the problem of explaining law’s normativity is commonly 
thought one of the central problems in conceptual jurisprudence.” Kenneth E. Himma, A 
Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligation: Social Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the 
Legal Obligations of Citizens 3 (Sept. 4, 2012) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141033; see also 
David Enoch, Reason-Giving and the Law, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 1 (Leslie 
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (addressing “the spectre of the normativity of law”). 
235.   See Greenberg, Principles, supra note 86, at 3 (stating, “[t]hat legal interpretation seeks to 
discover legal obligations (powers, rights, and so on) is partly intended to be a useful regimentation of 
ordinary usage”). 
236.   See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 10, at 34 (arguing that “[i]t is the 
same thing to say that when a judge runs out of rules he has discretion, in the sense that he is not 
bound by any standards from the authority of law, as to say that the legal standards judges cite other 
than rules are not binding on them”). 
237.   Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L. J. 823, 843 (1972). 
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Legal institutional conduct affects the community’s moral profile in 
complex ways, some obvious, some quite subtle. The variety of issues 
connected to the question of whether there is a duty to obey the law have 
been well visited in the literature.238 We should accept Greenberg’s 
understanding that ordinary citizens “do not have a general moral 
obligation to do what the legislature or other legal institutions 
command.”239 Whether members of a political community have special 
moral obligations to obey “legitimate” law has been debated, on the basis, 
for example, of associative, transactional and natural duty theories.240 
The political philosopher Jürgen Habermas put it well in his reaction 
against the Kantian “subordination of law to morality.”241 Appealing to 
citizens’ political autonomy and legislative self-determination, Habermas 
wrote that “[l]egitimate law is compatible only with a mode of legal 
coercion that does not destroy the rational motives for obeying the law: it 
must remain possible for everyone to obey legal norms on the basis of 
insight.”242 
Moral impacts upon the community, however, likely go well beyond 
the issue of a duty to obey the law. It is even conceivable that, in some 
instances, moral obligations can be generated precisely because officials 
have declined to impose legal duties. Consider, for example, a 
circumstance in which state law refrains from imposing a duty on 
employers or premises owners to test or safeguard air quality at the work 
site. Were the product seller to have no duty to warn, also under that 
state’s law, about hazardous dust-releasing components that it knows will 
 
 
238.   E.g., THE DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS (William A. 
Edmundson ed. 1999); RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 230, at 233–49.  
239.   Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 1318 (emphasis added); see supra text 
accompanying notes 163 & 171; cf. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL 
EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. VII, § 90 (1690) (distinguishing civil society from 
“absolute monarchy,” the former “setting up a known authority to which every one of that society may 
appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society 
ought to obey”); Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1, 62 (1985) 
(concluding that “the overall lesson of the exercise is that close examination reveals how complex, and 
how resistant to easy simplification, are the moral factors that bear on whether one should obey the 
law”). 
240.   See generally A. John Simmons, The Duty to Obey and Our Natural Moral Duties, in IS 
THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW 93, 109 (Raymond G. Frey ed., 2005). As Professor Dworkin said, 
“[a]ssociative obligations are complex, and much less studied by philosophers than the kinds of 
personal obligations we incur through discrete promises and other deliberate acts.” DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 196. 
241.   JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE 
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 120 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (1992). 
242.   Id. at 121. 
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be added to its product post-sale,243 such a no-duty ruling might then 
engender a moral responsibility on the part of the owner or employer to 
take protective action in lieu of the product seller. 
Similarly unexplored has been the community’s own argumentative 
structures for assessing legal institutional impacts. The settings will 
naturally range from small group conversations, including those between 
spouses, partners and siblings, to larger group contexts, such as block and 
community meetings, rallies, protests, and so forth,244 and on to local and 
national advocacy and election campaigns. Whereas litigants and officials 
acting within the legal system primarily train their arguments on standards 
for assessing whether the prior legal materials have been directed at the 
new situation with sufficient exactness, and stake their claims on 
competing interventionist interpretations of those materials,245 citizens in 
the community ask different questions. 
Dworkin sensibly discounted the possibility that political communities 
arise from voluntary associations, pace John Locke for one,246 because as 
people may not have chosen or consented to membership in their familial 
or biological group, they likewise may not have voluntarily associated 
with their larger political communities. He explained that the associative 
obligations can nevertheless be unwrapped by applying the interpretive 
attitude, by which we ask what membership in the community means, 
what are the responsibilities we owe one another, and what can we expect 
from others if we count them as members of our associative community.247 
We can then interpret our associative obligations in the way ““most people 
think of them,” namely, by virtue of the obligations that arise “under 
social practices that define groups and attach special responsibilities to 
membership . . . .”248 
  
 
 
243.   See, e.g., O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 991 (2012). 
244.   See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 352, 353 (2015) (describing how, after police officer Sean Williams had killed John 
Crawford, a twenty-two-year-old black man, at an Ohio Wal-Mart, the author immersed in the “Justice 
for John Crawford campaign: advising on civil disobedience actions, organizing legal observers and 
jail support, and accompanying organizers to meetings with cops and prosecutors”). 
245.   See supra text accompanying notes 98–103. 
246.   JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 117 (1690) (arguing that “free men 
who are born under government do give their consent to it, doing this through the inheritance of 
land”). 
247.   DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 199. Some scholars have pointed out, 
however, that the natural duty perspective does not readily particularize the duty to the local political 
community. See e.g., Christopher H. Wellman, Samaritanism and the Duty to Obey the Law, in IS 
THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW 1, 35 (Raymond G. Frey ed., 2005). 
248.   DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 77, at 198. 
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We may very well not agree with Dworkin’s theorizing here in service 
of the law-as-integrity program, but the point is that the community, 
comprised for the most part of “good citizens,” might well see things in a 
Dworkinian light. It is unlikely, for instance, that community members 
believe their obligations in relation to the political and legal system end 
with “rules hammered out in political compromise.”249 For Dworkin, 
members of such a “rulebook” community generally accept that they 
ought to obey rules arrived at by certain procedures, “but they assume that 
the content of these rules exhausts their obligation.”250 He understandably 
recoils from the poverty of such a conception of community. 
Dworkin’s contrasting view of the genuinely associative community 
may provide helpful guidance in thinking about the parameters for 
argument through which community members process legal institutional 
actions. Consider, for example, the debate over legislation encouraging 
law enforcement officials to inquire into the citizenship status of detained 
individuals. Arguments touch on whether the undocumented person whose 
work benefits the community should be considered a member of the 
associative group, whether the group’s well-being is hampered by virtue of 
immigrant’s disincentive to report crime, and so forth.251 
This helps illustrate why the attributes of a genuinely associative 
community are not self-executing, but must be nurtured. A community can 
easily regress from holding group-centered obligations in special regard, 
and even more so from a sense of responsibility and concern for the well-
being of group members, individually and collectively. These, indeed, are 
some of the concerns animating those taking sides in the sanctuary city 
debates. For example, sanctuary city advocates will tend to decry the 
unduly restrictive sense of community seemingly represented by their 
opponents. At the same time, however, those opposing sanctuary status 
may believe the same about their own adversaries, taking their political 
community to begin, on that issue anyway, at the federal level and in the 
 
 
249.   Id. at 211. 
250.   Id. at 210. Apart from a genuinely associative polis, and the rulebook community, the 
third model of community Dworkin outlined was that of members bound together “as a de facto 
accident of history and geography,” id. at 209, which he summarily dismisses as admitting merely of 
the sort of community in which people “have no interest in one another except as means to their own 
selfish ends.” Id. at 212. Cf. Julius Cohen, The Political Element in Legal Theory: A Look At Kelsen’s 
Pure Theory, 88 YALE L. J. 1, 17 (1978) (stating of the German legal theorist Hans Kelsen, that he 
“adopts the lens of the rational egoist, perceiving ‘community’ as no more than a prudent, contrived 
convention to implement selfish needs and interests of individuals”). 
251.   See Jonathan Blitzer, Why Police Chiefs Oppose Texas’s New Anti-Immigration Law, THE 
NEW YORKER, June 2, 2017, at www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk. 
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form of border violation legislation.252 
This is not the place to discuss associative community at length. For 
now, we can end by surmising that, at the least, the robust or healthy 
political community would be attentive to the moral attitude about its 
governing law and legal institutional actions. Most members would likely 
agree that general good citizenship requires that they aspire toward 
morally legitimate governance, and likely that they obey laws generally 
seen as good. More controversial would be the issue of whether 
community members have any obligation to object to, or protest, those 
deemed bad or harmful. 
And by virtue of the moral attitude held by members of a healthy 
political community, they would likely view themselves as obligated to 
assess the moral impacts of law’s institutional actions. This, however, is 
not the way they would put it. They would view themselves as deliberating 
over the merits of the law itself, mostly as conveyed to them linguistically, 
either directly from judicial and legislative sources or via interpretive 
expertise. Numerous internal psychological and external structural 
circumstances condition the nature of that deliberation.253 If assessing the 
moral impacts of state actions is itself a legitimate obligation assumed, at 
least sometimes, by members of well-functioning associative 
communities, then we have come full circle, and found a home for the 
Moral Impact Theory that genuinely aligns with actual practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Moral Impact Theory is innovative and compelling. The elegant 
diagnosis underlying the Theory is that the link between the meaning of 
legal texts and the rights and obligations they engender requires 
argument.254 Greenberg’s argument is that legal institutional actions are a 
means of changing our obligations, rather than directly communicating 
them.255 
But Greenberg’s is an argument. While a moral impacts approach 
offers a one-system explanation of how legal obligations arise, it elides 
 
 
252.   See generally Rose C. Villazor, “Santuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 573, 574 (2010) (contrasting the traditional view of citizenship as residing “primarily in the 
nation-state” with alternative views situating citizenship in other political communities). 
253.   See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, A Contextual Approach to Disobedience, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 
48, 75 (1970) (reflecting that, “[i]f the existing channels of political decision-making are rigged, then 
one who disagrees with laws may have less reason to doubt his own judgment of their unfairness and 
less confidence that orderly attempts to achieve change will succeed”). 
254.   Greenberg, Legal Interpretation, supra note 72, at 219. 
255.   Id. 
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legal institutions’ lack of epistemic capability for reckoning those moral 
impacts, and does not ultimately grapple with the nature of law’s 
argumentative structure and the sort of critical thinking that discretely 
characterizes legal deliberation. 
Legal obligation can be explained in other ways. A legal system 
realizes its institutional mission—including resolving disputes, creating 
and manipulating norms, conveying powers and permissions—to the 
extent that participants and community members are both capable of 
understanding what is expected of them and collectively recognized as 
carrying those status assignments. Recognition of obligation, however, 
presupposes the concept of an obligation, which is conveyed linguistically 
and laden with propositional content.256 The obligations themselves derive 
from legal institutional action that represents those obligations as existing. 
In a profound jurisprudential study, one scholar inquired after the 
changing forms of Nomos “through the longue durée of discourse, 
argument, criticism, formulation, and reformulation . . . that comes down 
to us in largely textual terms.”257 He concluded, “it is the very condition of 
communication, understanding, and the medium of language that permits, 
if not a meeting of minds, at least plausible interpretation over an expanse 
of time.”258 In actual practice, legal officials, as well as the larger 
community, appear to see things this way. 
 
 
256.   Greenberg effectively concedes this. Greenberg, Moral Impact Theory, supra note 1, at 
1295 n.12 (acknowledging that, “[s]trictly speaking, the content of the law is not, say, the obligation to 
take a particular action, but that one is obligated to take the relevant action”). 
257.   KELLEY, supra note 110, at xi. 
258.   Id. 
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